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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKRUPTCY-PROVABLE CLAIMS-DAMAGES FOR BREAcu oF CHATTEL LEASE.-
The plaintiff leased to each of the defendants for a five year term, a specially
constructed neon sign. The leases provided that upon the bankruptcy of the lessee,
the lessor could elect, after giving notice of his intention to do so, to retake the
sign and declare the balance of the rentals due, or, to retake the sign without notice
and hold the lessee liable for damages suffered as a result of the default. On the
bankruptcy of the lessees, the lessor, without giving notice, repossessed the signs
and claimed damages for the breach of the leases. Two of the signs were sold
and one was dismantled by the lessor. On appeal from judgments allowing the
claims to be proved for the sum of construction costs minus the rentals received and
the salvage value, held, that the lessor could prove his actual damages which are
the total of the unaccrued rents less whatever savings accrued to him by reason of
the default. Judgments reversed. Electrical Products Consolidated v. Sweet, 83 F.
(2d) 6 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936).
It is well recognized, as pointed out in the instant case, that claims in bankruptcy
arising out of the breach of leases of chattels have been accorded different treatment
from that adopted where the leases concerned realty. In the early cases under the
National Bankruptcy Act' no claim for future rents could be proved by a lessor
upon the bankruptcy of his lessee, for it was held impossible to determine, at the
time the petition was filed, whether the lessee would ever become liable to meet
the obligations on which the claims were based.2 The courts denied these claims
on the further ground that the amount of the lessor's damage was not susceptible
of accurate estimate. 3 The difficulty due to the contingency of the lessee's liability
was removed when, upon an intimation from the courts,4 clauses were inserted into
realty leases under which bankruptcy operated as an ipso facto breach.5 To dispose
of the uncertainty as to the amount of damages, the courts upheld covenants pro-
viding that upon bankruptcy, the lessee of realty was to pay, not as rent, but as
liquidated damages, the difference between the unaccrued rent and the fair rental
value of the premises for the remainder of the term.0 Liquidated damages clauses,
however, could not be relied upon as a solution to the problem of fixing damages,
for, in many cases of realty and chattel leases, such provisions were held to
constitute penalties. 7  The question as to the method of computing damages was
1. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (1927).
2. Lamson Consol. Store Service Co. v. Bowland, 114 Fed. 639 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902);
Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); In re Rubel, 166 Fed. 131 (E. D.
Wis. 1908); In re Roth v. Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Colman Co. v. Wit-
hoft, 195 Fed. 250 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912).
3. Manhattan Properties Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320 (1934); In re Roth v.
Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Wright v. Irving Trust Co., 70 F. (2d) 245
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
4. See Manhattan Properties v. Irving Trust Co., 291 U. S. 320, 338 (1934).
5. Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307 (1934); Irving Trust Co. v. Bowditch,
293 U. S. 311 (1934); In re Outfitters Operating Realty Co., 69 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934).
6. Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307 (1934); Irving Trust Co. v. Bowditch,
293 U. S. 311 (1934); In re Outfitters' Operating Realty Co., 69 F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934).
7. Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust Co., 280 U. S. 224 (1930); see In re Quaker Drug
Co., 204 Fed. 689, 691 (W. D. Wash. 1913); In re F. & W. Grand 5-10-25 Cent Stores,
Inc., 69 F. (2d) 807, 808 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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settled, with regard to realty cases, by the passing of Section 63 (a) 78 of the
National Bankruptcy Act. This statute provides that a claim for damages on an
executory contract is provable and that where the contract is a lease of realty the
amount of the claim shall not exceed the rent reserved for the year following the
surrender of the premises.
As is illustrated by the holding of the instant case, wherein the claims against two
of the bankrupts were proved under Section 63 (a) 7, a claim on a chattel lease
comes under that Section as one for "damages respecting executory contracts."0
Nevertheless, with reference to leases of chattels, there still remains the difficulty
of estimating the amount for which the claimant may prove. It is very likely that
the legislators did not set a norm for fixing the damages where chattel leases were
involved, as they had done with realty, because the variance between different
types of personalty made unwise the application of any single rule.
In view of the eagerness of the courts to permit claims to be proved wherever
possible,' 0 it appears necessary, in order to eliminate confusion, that some fixed
rules be formulated for ascertaining damages in chattel lease cases. An arbitrary
statutory solution similar to that in realty1 ' would not do justice, for the loss
suffered by the lessor depends upon whether the chattel, in any given case, is one
which can be relet. Where, as in the case at bar, the leased article is adaptable
to the use of only the individual lessee, the damages might be computed by deducting
the salvage value of the chattel and any other savings to the lessor derived through
the breach, from the unaccrued rent.
A more difficult problem is presented where the chattel is such that the lessor's
loss may be mitigated by a reletting, for the actual figure that he will be able to
obtain as a rental cannot be predicted. The courts, then faced with a problem
analogous to that formerly presented by leases of realty, might adopt a precedent
laid down in a realty case prior to the enactment of the new statute.12 That is, the
damages might be estimated by subtracting the fair rental value for the remainder
of the term from the unaccrued rent. It is submitted that, in view of the present
uncertaintyla as to the correct measure of damages in cases of chattel leases, some
such definite and just rules are necessary.
8. 48 STAT. 923 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (1935). "Claims for damages Y-espect-
ing executory contracts including future rents . . . but the claim of a landlord for injury
resulting from the rejection by the trustee of an unexpired lease of real estate . .. s all
in no event be allowed in an amount exceeding the rent 'reserved by the lease, without
acceleration, for the year next succeeding the date of the surrender of the premises.. ..
9. Ibid.
10. See Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 236 U. S. 549, 554 (1915).
11. See note 8, supra.
12. Irving Trust Co. v. Perry, 293 U. S. 307 (1934).
13. That there is confusion on this question is amply illustrated by the instant case
where the trial court calculated the claim by adding construction costs and selling ex-
pense, and subtracted from this sum the total of rent received and the salvage value. By
these computations the lessor was restored to somewhat the same position as if no con-
tract had existed.
In another case where the chattel could not be elet, the court allowed the lessor to
prove for the total of unaccrued rent with no deduction for salvage values. In re Caswell-
Massey Co., 208 Fed. 571 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
In some instances where it appeared that the chattel would be of use to others, the
courts permitted the lessor to repossess it but no further damages have been allowed.
Lamson Consol. Store Service Co. v. Bowland, 114 Fed. 639 (C. C. A. 6th, 1902); In re
Merwin v. Willoughby Co., 206 Fed. 116 (N. D. N. Y. 1913); In re Miller Bros. Gro-
cery Co. 219 Fed. 851 (C. C. A. 6th; 1915).
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]YANKRUPTCY-RIGHT TO WITHDRAW A CLAIM.-The plaintiff bank filed in the
bankruptcy proceedings of Steinreich Associates, Inc., a petition for leave to with-
draw a claim against the bankrupt estate which it had theretofore filed. The claim
was based on a promissory note made by the bankrupt upon which a sum had been
credited, leaving a balance unpaid when the claim was filed. The trustee in bank-
ruptcy had filed objections to the claim on the ground of a preference, but there
had been no hearing on the merits. The motion for leave to withdraw showed that
the balance due had been paid from the proceeds of a sale of stock held by the
plaintiff bank as collateral security for the personal guarantee of the payment of the
note by Kenneth P. Steinreich. On appeal from an order denying the motion for
leave to withdraw, held, the claimant may not withdraw his claim against the bank-
rupt estate after objections thereto by the trustee in bankruptcy, as the trustee had
a substantial right to establish the existence of a preference. Order affirmed. In
re Steinreich Associates, Inc., 83 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
The general view, in both England and America, with respect to the voluntary dis-
continuance of an action in equity, is that a plaintiff may dismiss his bill, upon payment
of costs, if the dismissal will not destroy some substantial right of the defendant which
has accrued since the filing of the bill.1 The courts have denied the motion to with-
draw when the defendant has filed a cross-bill seeking affirmative relief, or when
they felt that the withdrawal would work inequitable hardship upon him.2 However,
they have proclaimed that the mere prospect of being harassed and vexed by future
litigation is not a prejudice and hence not sufficient reason to preclude the dismissal
of a suit.3
Under the general rule, it would seem that in the instant case the plaintiff would
be permitted to withdraw his claim, for the right of withdrawal is absolute 4 rather
than discretionary. The defendant had not filed a cross-bill asking for affirmative
relief but merely interposed an objection, and the deprivation of the opportunity
to have the question of preference adjudicated would not work inequitable hardship
upon hiia.5 However, the general rule is not applicable. Certain District Courts,
in accordance with the power granted to them,0 promulgated a rule of equity pro-
1. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co., 171 U. S. 138 (1898); Mc-
Gowan v. Columbia River Packers' Ass'n, 245 U. S. 352 (1917); Ex parte Skinner & Eddy
Corp., 265 U. S. 86 (1924); Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 55 Fed. 569 (C. C. E. D. Mich.
1893); Watt v. Crawford, 11 Paige 470 (N. Y. 1845); Cooper v. Lewis, 2 Phil. 178, 41
Eng. Reprints 909 (Ch. 1847).
2. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Central Transportation Co., 171 U. S. 138 (1898) and
Detroit v. Detroit City Ry., 55 Fed. 569 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1893) (cross-bill filed asking
for affirmative relief); American Bell Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 69 Fed. 666
(C. C. A. 1st, 1895) (after decree of reference entered in accordance with a stipulation
of the parties to refer the cause to a master).
3. Gilmore v. Bort, 134 Fed. 658 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1905); Cowhan v. McNlder, 261
Fed. 714 (E. D. Mich. 1919); Hines v. Martin, 286 Fed. 653 (C. C. A. 5th, 1923).
4. "The right (of a plaintiff] to dismiss, if it exists, is absolute." Ex parle Skinner &
Eddy Corp., 265 U. S. 86, 93 (1924).
5. Depriving a trustee in bankruptcy of the opportunity to have a question of prefer-
ence adjudicated, has been held not a legal prejudice which would warrant denial of a
preferred creditor's petition to withdraw his claim. Scholl Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Rodgers, 51 F.
(2d) 971 (C. C. A. 8th, 1931).
6. The Supreme Court of the United States has the power to make uniform equity
rules. for the District Courts so long as they do not conflict with an act of Congress.
5 STAT. 518 (1842), 28 U. S. C. A. § 730 (1928); Friedenstein v. United States, 125 U. S.
224 (1887); United States v. Barber Lumber Co., 169 Fed. 184 (C. C. Idaho 1908). The
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cedure7 making the dismissal of suits discretionary8 rather than of right, and en-
larging the meaning of prejudice so as to include the vexation and annoyance of a
second suit upon the same cause of action. It has been decided that the rule is
procedural rather than substantive, and so within the power of judicial regulation.°
Under this rule of the District Courts, it seems that while in many instances the
result reached would be just and equitable, in others it may be unwarranted and
injurious. In the Palmenberg case,10 where leave to withdraw was denied, not only
had issue been joined upon the main question, but also upon the question of prefer-
ence, with hearings upon the merits. Moreover the evidence seemed to be going
against the claimant so that it truly would have been an injustice to the trustee
to have permitted a withdrawal.11 But in the principal case, although the question
of a preference had been raised by the trustee, no hearing on the merits had been
held. The claimant sought to withdraw, not because the proof so far given was a
fair basis for anticipating a decision in favor of his opponent, but rather because
his claim had been paid by the guarantor, and he had no more reason to pursue
his suit against the defendant.
While it is true that the guarantor may be subrogated in place of the claimant
after he has paid the claim,' 2 still he has not asked to be so subrogated. It would
seem that the enforcement of the rule so as to compel the plaintiff to continue his
suit when he is no longer interested and when the guarantor has not moved to
bring suit in his name, does more of an injustice to the claimant than justice to the
trustee. The trustee would lose no rights by a dismissal, for he would still have to
bring an action to recover the preference.13
The District Court rule is an excellent one promulgated to protect the rights of
District Courts may make additional rules of practice and procedure in any matter not
inconsistent with any law of the United States or any rule of the Supreme Court. 1 STAT.
335, as amd. 5 STAT. 513 (1342), 28 U. S. C. A. § 731 (1928); U. S. Supreme Court Equity
Rules, Rule 79; Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Jones, 13 Fed. 567 (C. C. Vt 1882).
7. "Voluntary Discontinuances. If justice requires, the Court, after issue joined, may
refuse to permit the plaintiff to discontinue even though the defendant cannot have
affirmative relief under the pleadings and though his only prejudice be the vexation and
expense of a possible second suit upon the same cause of action." District Court, So.
Dist. N. Y., Equity Rules, Rule 2; East. Dist., Equity Rules, Rule 4.
8. In re J. R. Palmenberg Sons, Inc., 76 F. (2d) 935 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), aTd Bronx
Brass Foundry, Inc. v. Irving Trust Co., 297 U. S. 230 (1936).
9. Ibid. The Supreme Court has also pointed out that the Palmenberg care has not
changed the general rule. "... . a dismissal must be granted if no prejudice be shown
beyond the prospect of another suit, unless there be a specific rule of court to the con-
trary ... " Jones v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 298 U. S. 1, 22 (1936).
10. See note 8, supra.
11. "To have deprived the trustee of the right to establish in the summary proceedings
the fact of a preference would have been to take away a substantial right? In re J. R.
Palmenberg Sons, Inc., 76 F. (2d) 935, 936 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
12. BANK.RUPTCY ACT, 30 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93 (i) (1927) provides:
'rWhenever a creditor whose claim against a bankrupt estate is secured by the individual
undertaking of any person, fails to prove such claims, such person may do so in the
creditor's name, and if he discharge such undertaking in whole or in part he shall be
subrogated to that extent to the rights of the creditor.'
13. The instant court in admitting this point emphasizes the fact that the determina-
tion of the preference would be res adjudicata. The benefit of res adjudicata here is
illusory for the effort to establish the preference may as well be made in the following
suit for its recovery as in the summary proceeding.
1936]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
defendants and assure to them the execution of justice; but it must be remembered
that the plaintiff's general right of withdrawal has not been entirely obliterated, and this,
too, must be protected. It seems that the court in its discretion should limit the
rule in its application to those cases where failure to apply it would patently injure
the defendant and give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over him; but it should
not be applied in instances where assistance to the defendant causes undue injury or
unnecessary annoyance to the plaintiff as seems to be the result in the instant case.
CONFLICT OF LAW-S-PUBLIC POLICY-As GROUND FOR REFUSAL To ENFORCE
FOREIGN-CREATED RIGHT.-The plaintiff brought an action in New York against her
husband to recover damages for personal injuries which she alleged she sustained in
Connecticut through her husband's negligent operation of his automobile. The
parties were residents of New York. The law of Connecticut allows such an action
to be maintained;' New York forbids the maintenance of this type of suit.2 On
appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division which affirmed a judgment of
Special Term dismissing the complaint, held, two judges dissenting, that it is con-
trary to the public policy of New York to enforce a right of action for personal
injuries sustained by a wife through the negligence of her husband even though
such right was enforcible in the state where it was acquired. Judgment affirmed.
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
This case exemplifies some of the difficulties resulting from the use of the vague
and elusive concept, public policy. In conflict of law cases, this concept is of
particular importance because of the well established rule, which New York has
applied in the instant case, that the forum will enforce a cause of action created in
a foreign state, unless the public policy of the forum forbids.3 But what is the
public policy in a given case, and when is it offended? In an attempt to define
this term, courts have said that the juridical meaning of public policy is the law
of the state stemming from the constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions. 4 If,
however, there is no manifestation in our constitution, statutes, or judicial decisions
of a definite public policy relating to a particular question, the courts, before
refusing to enforce a foreign-created right, must be convinced that recognition of
it would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception
of good morals, or some deep rooted tradition of the common weal." 5  In the
1. CoNx. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5154, construed by the following cases to abolish the
common law interdict regarding personal tort actions between husband and wife: Brown
v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914) (wife may sue husband for assault and bat-
tery); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 Atl. 432 (1925) (wife may sue husband
for negligent tort).
2. N. Y. Dorm. REL,. LAW (1909) § 57, construed by the following cases to mean that
the common law interdict had not been abolished: Allen v. Allen, 246 N. Y. 571, 159
N. E. 656 (1927); Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23 (1935). See (1936) 5
FoRDHAm L. Rzv. 186, 187.
3. Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 (1917); 3 BEAL-, CONIcT OF LAws (1935) 1647;
1 WHARToN, CONFLCr OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 4a; RESTATEwENT, CONFLICr OF LAws
(1934) § 612. It is interesting to note the Restatement requires that the cause of action
arising in a foreign state must be against the "strong" public policy of the forum. This
suggests that a cause of action which is not very offensive to the state's public policy
should be enforced.
4. Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 43 U. S. 126 (1844); Hollis v. Drew, 95 N. Y. 166 (1884);
People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1, 51 N. E. 257 (1898).
5. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 111, 120 N. E. 198, 202 (1916).
[Vol. 5
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instant case the Court has confined its holding to the juridical meaning of public
policy. 6 It is undoubtedly true that this meaning serves a useful purpose in that it
furnishes an affirmative declaration of the state's internal public policy. But when
a case involving comity7 is concerned-when the extra-territorial effect of a foreign
created right is to be determined-such a definition8 is incomplete since it does
not penetrate to the essence of public policy. The more penetrating analysis which
has been suggested requires a critical investigation into factors sociological, economic,
and political. This approach will necessarily give due weight to the vital interests
of the state and its citizens with emphasis upon a consideration of the good of the
whole people.9 By this more exhaustive evaluation of the public pulse, the forum
may amply justify the recognition or non-recognition of foreign-created rights. 10
Clearly, New York has a well-settled aversion to the creation of tort liability
6. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
7. Non-Tecognition of a foreign-created right is grounded upon the rule that comity
does not require a state to enforce the statutes of a foreign jurisdiction manifestly con-
trary to the established public policy of the forum. Texas & P. Ry. v. Cox, 145 U. S.
593 (1892); Christily v. Warner, 87 Conn. 461, 88 AUt. 711 (1913); Howarth v. Lom-
bard, 175 Blass. 570, 56 N. E. 888 (1900); Brown v. Perry, 104 Vt. 66, 156 AtL 910
(1931).
8. It is interesting to note that this definition was derived from a case which did not
involve conflict of laws. People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1, 51 N. E. 257 (1898). It is
questionable whether its place in conflict of law cases is sound. Even when applied
to local public policy it may be criticized. See Pittsburgh C. C. & St. Louis Ry. v.
Kinney, 95 Ohio 64, 68, 115 N. E. 505, 507 (1916) wherein it was said, "The obvious
fallacy of such a conclusion (i.e., limiting public policy to this definition) is quite ap-
parent from the most superficial examination. When a contract is contrary to some pro-
vision of the Constitution, we say it is prohibited by the Constitution, not by public
policy. When a contract is contrary to a statute, we say it is prohibited by a statute, not
by a public policy. When a contract is contrary to a settled line of judicial decisions,
we say it is contrary to the law of the land, but we do not say that it is contrary to
public policy. Public policy is the cornerstone-the foundation-of all Constitutionsm,
statutes, and judicial decisions."
9. It seems that by this approach that the basic factors, vi., public health, social wel-
fare, good morals, public safety, etc., which constitute a public policy will be given due
consideration. A violation of any one of these often amounts to a sufficient breach of the-
public policy of a state to justify its refusal to render aid. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Babcod,
154 U. S. 190 (1894) (foreign law against public policy when contrary to good morals.
or injurious to the state or its citizens); Bond v. Hume, 243 U. S. 15 (1916) (aid ren-
dered when foreign cause of action is not repugnant to good morals); Reilly v. Th-
Antonio Pepe Co., 108 Conn. 436, 143 Ad. 568 (1928) (rights not offensive to morals
or injurious to public rights are enforceable in forum); Higgins v. Central N. E. & W.
Ry., 155 Mass. 176, 29 N. E. 534 (1892) (rights not unjust or contrary to good morals.
are enforceable in forum).
10. The courts of the United States ordinarily employ the public policy concept to.
nullify a foreign law with the result that the action, otherwise maintainable, is pro-
hibited. Often, however, the foreign law may be relied upon as a defense and here the-
action is permitted if the defense set up is against the public policy of the forum, as it
was held to be in Holzer v. Deutsche Rechbahn-Gesellschaft, 159 Misc. 830 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. 1936), aff'd 247 App. Div. 786, 288 N. Y. Supp. 736 (1st Dep't 1936) (defense based
on German non-Aryan laws struck out upon motion since these laws are contrary to.
American public policy); Comment (1936) 45 YLx.n L. J. 1463.
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between husband and wife, 11 revealed by its reluctance to change the common law
rule and by its unwavering line of decisions on the issue for more than half a
century.12 Nevertheless, the enforcement of a foreign created right should not
be denied unless it is abhorrent to fundamental principles of justice, human instincts,
and good morals.' 3
The principal case discloses a great departure from the liberal view expressed in
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.14 In that case Cardozo, J., expounded the doctrine that
our courts should recognize a foreign law unless such action would contravene the
standards of the forum in their varying forms. 15 The instant Court's assumption
was that since the law of Connecticut differs from the law of New York, the
public policy of this State prevents recognition of the foreign right. The mere fact
that the law of the forum differs from the lex loci is clearly an insufficient ground
upon which to base a refusal to recognize a foreign law.10 In this debatable area of
liability, changing throughout the states from year to year, enforcement of such
foreign law can hardly be said to be repugnant to good morals nor would it lead
to a disturbance of local law or menace the public welfare. To refuse enforcement
on grounds of public policy seems to constitute "an assumed virtue of superiority
which cannot be justified. . . ."1 Two other important cases which have paved
the way for this recession from the Loucks case are Strauss v. Canadian Pac. Ry.
Co.18 and Herzog v. Stern.19 The former, which held unenforceable provisions of
a bill of lading issued at a foreign port exempting a carrier from liability for
negligence, seemingly ignores the doctrine set out in the Loucks case. The latter
case was an action against the executors of a deceased resident of this State to
recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff in Virginia through the
negligence of the testator, the cause of action surviving by the lex loci. This case,
decided on grounds other than public policy, contains a very strong dictum to the
effect that 'even if "jurisdictional" reasons would not militate against enforcement
of the claim, the public policy of the forum was sufficiently opposed to prevent
enforcement in New York.20 It is paradoxical that New York should virtually
11. See note 2, supra. Comment (1935) 4 FoRDi:Am L. REv. 475-484.
12. Longendyke v. Longendyke, 44 Barb. 366 (N. Y. 1863); Freethy v. Freethy, 42
Barb. 641 (N. Y. 1865); Schultz v. Schultz, 89 N. Y. 644 (1882).
13. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918). See note 9,
supra.
14. 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918).
15. See note 5, supra.
16. Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 110, 120 N. E. 198, 201
(1916). He also said: "Our own scheme of legislation may be different. We may even
have no legislation on the subject. That is not enough to show that public policy for-
bids us to enforce the foreign right. A right of action is property. If a foreign statute
gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing
to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him. We are not so provincial as to say
that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home."
Cf. Goo,6mcH, CoNFLIcT oF LAws (1927) 11-12.
17. Herzog v. Stern, 264 N. Y. 379, 387, 191 N. E. 23, 26 (1934).
18. 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E. 564 (1930).
19. 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934).
20. Id. at 384, 191 N. E. at 25. This case involved § 120 of the N. Y. DEcEMDT
ESTATE LAW which governed the devolution and administration of property In New York
belonging to its residents. This statute did not permit the bringing of an action for
personal injuries against the executors or administrators of a deceased resident; in this
respect the common law rule was retained. Under these circumstances the courts, of
[Vol. 5
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reject a doctrine as sound as that expounded in the Loucks case when the attitude
of that case has been approved and followed in other jurisdictions.2 1 Such a retro-
gression cannot be justified, especially in view of the growing tendency throughout
the country toward a broader comity between sister states. Moreover, when it is
noted that the number of states allowing personal tort actions between husband
and wife is rapidly increasingm a consideration of this changing attitude should not
be ignored even though it is not employed to effect a change in our local law.2 4
The Loucks case sets the compass course in the field of enforcibility of foreign
created right; it is to be regretted that the instant decision departs from the
charted way.
CONsTITuTIoNAL LAw-UNEMPLOYIENT INsuRANcE-NEw YoRx UNEIPLOY-
=NT INSURANCE LAw.-Three actions were instituted in the Supreme Court, in
which the complaints asked for declaratory judgments that the New York Unem-
ployment Insurance Law' was unconstitutional under both the federal and the state
New York were without jurisdiction to entertain such a cause of action. A new section,
added in 1935, now permits such an action. N. Y. Drc. EsT. LAw (1935) § 118.
21. Curtis v. Campbell, 76 F. (2d) 84 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935); Veytia v. Alvarez, 30
Ariz. 316, 247 Pac. 117 (1926); Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362, 10 P. (2d) 63 (1932);
Reilly v. The Antonio Pepe Co., 103 Conn. 436, 143 AU. 563 (1928); Broderick v. McGuire,
119 Conn. 83, 174 AUt. 314 (1934); Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 234 N. W.
314 (1931); Gray v. Gray, 174 At. 508 (N. H. 1934); McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422,
285 Pac. 208 (1930); Wellman v. Mead, 93 Vt. 322, 107 AtL 396 (1919).
22. See note 7, supra.
23. Cases allowing an action between spouses for an intended wrong are: Johnson v.
Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S. W.
832 (1916); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 At. 889 (1914); Crowell v. Crowell,
181 N. C. 66, 106 S. E. 149 (1921); Note (1920-21) 34 HAnv. L. Rzv. 676. Cas2s allow-
ing an action between spouses for negligent wrongs are: Bennett v. Bennett, 224 Ala. 335,
140 So. 378 (1932); Katzenberg v. Katzenberg, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S. W. (2d) 696 (1931);
Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 At]. 432 (1925); Roberts v. Roberts, 185
N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923); Wait -v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (1926).
See Comment (1935) 4 FoRDnAr L. REV. 475.
24. In Klein v. Marevelas, 219 N. Y. 383, 114 N. E. 809 (1916), the fact that the
great weight of opinion among the states was against existing New York law motivated
the court to change it so that the court's past decision on the constitutionality of the
Bulk Sales Law would not "stand in opposition to the uniform convictions of the entire
judiciary of the land.' Although the "entire judiciary of the land" has not rendered
judgment concerning personal tort actions between the spouses, it seems reasonable to
say that a foreign right which does not prejudicially affect the interests of the forum
should, at least, be recognized. Recognition of a right acquired in another state is by no
means as drastic as a change in the local law.
1. N. Y. LAws 1935, c. 468, N. Y. LABOR LAw (1935) §§ 500-531. The statute covers
employers and employees in every kind of occupation except agriculture, family employ-
ment, religious, charitable or educational work, employment by the state or governmental
subdivisions and employees in non-manual work whose salaries are more than fifty dol-
lars a week. All other employers, defined as persons who have regularly employed four
or more persons for a given period, must contribute annually, to a state unemployment
insurance fund, three per cent. of the total annual wages paid to insured employees. The
contributions from all employers are pooled by deposit in this one fund which will con-
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constitutions. One Special Term2 adjudged the law to be unconstitutional and void
in its entirety on the grounds that the plaintiff was deprived of its property without
due process of laws and was denied the equal protection of law; 4 another Special
Term5 held the law valid except insofar as it constitutes the taking of property
without due process by requiring employers to contribute to the fund for benefits,
allowed after a ten week period of idleness, to employees who have been lawfully
discharged or who have left their employment either voluntarily or by reason of an
industrial controversy.6 On appeal directly to the Court of Appeals,1 held, two
judges dissenting, that the law was constitutional in its entirety. W. H. H. Chamber-
lin, Inc. v. Andrews, Industrial Com'r, 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936).
In the widespread confusion growing out of the numerous constitutionally un-
charted attempts to cope with the unprecedented social and economic problems
either caused or aggravated by the depression, the decision in the instant case stands
out as a liberal, forward step of considerable legal significance. Brushing aside per-
suasive constitutional objections to the Unemployment Insurance Law itself, the
court takes judicial notice of the extent of unemployment and the acuteness of the
social problem which the measure was designed to ameliorate.8 Calling attention
to the fact that vast sums of state and federal money have been spent to keep
housed and alive the unemployed and their families, and that such help was abso-
lutely necessary, the court concludes that the state must have power to act "in
such trouble".9 If instead of the dole system, the legislature, after investigation.
and study, proposes an insurance system which seems to it a better plan "to meet
the evils and dangers of unemployment in the future", the court finds "nothing
sist solely of such payments since neither the state nor employees contribute. The pro-
portion of unemployment and the degree of irregularity of employment in an employer's
business are immaterial in calculating the tax he must pay because the law, unlike such
statutes in other states, imposes the same contribution on all employers. Benefits from
this fund are payable to each insured employee who establishes that he is totally un-
employed and that he has been employed for a specified period in the year o " two years
immediately preceding his unemployment. The amount and duration of benefits are
specifically limited and a "waiting period" of three weeks must intervene between the
filing of notice of unemployment and the commencement of benefits. If the employee
was discharged for misconduct or lost his employment because of a strike, he may still
receive benefits but the "waiting period" is extended to ten weeks. An employee who
refuses offered employment, not objectionable on grounds specified in the statute loses
his right to benefits. The industrial commissioner of the state is charged with the ad-
ministration of the law and an advisory council is created to study its operation and to
recommend changes. For an analysis of the New York Unemployment Insurance Law,
see Gray, Unemployment Insurance in the State of New York (1935) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q.
REv. 19; Legis. (1935) 4 FoRDHAx L. REv. 485.
2. Associated Industries of New York State, Inc. v. Department of Labor of New York,
158 Misc. 350, 286 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1936), rev'd 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936).
3. U. S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1.
4. N. Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6.
5. W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, Industrial Com'r., 159 Misc. 124, 286 N. Y.
Supp. 242 (Sup. Ct. 1936), modified 271 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. (2d) 22 (1936).
6. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) § 504 (2).
7. In accordance with N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act (1936) § 588 (3) since a constitutional
question solely was presented for review.
8. See W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 9, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 23
(1936).
9. Id. at 9i 2 N. E. (2d) at 24.
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unreasonable or unconstitutional in the legislative act" since under either system
"the public at large pays the bill".'0
Regardless of whether or not this is suggestive of the controversial "fact ap-
proach",11 it obviously is not the traditional, precedent-conforming judicial ap-
proach. In striking contrast to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Morelzead v. People ex rel. Tipaldo,1 2 holding New York's Minimum Wage Law
unconstitutional, wherein the Court based its conservative ruling squarely upon its
decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,'3 the Court of Appeals considers first the
social desirabilities and the economic necessities and, with this background, seems
to evaluate the Unemployment Insurance Law more as "an attempt to solve a great
and pressing problem of government" 14 than as a question of constitutional law.
It is submitted that the tolerant judicial attitude toward important provisions in the
law, of which the court is critical, is otherwise difficult to explain.15
While it is true that in considering a statute involving the present exercise of
the reserve power of the state, the court must of necessity weigh the seriousness
of the problem and its social and economic implications, it does not follow that
this is the only consideration. The police power is an extremely broad power,
incapable of accurate definition and requiring that each case be decided on its own
particular facts.' 6  Its legitimate exercise in the interest of the general welfare
does not violate due process.17 Even though the declared purpose of the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Law is to promote the public welfare and prosperity,18 this ob-
jective is not controlling unless the means used are reasonably calculated to attain
that end constitutionally.' 9  Moreover, the legislature cannot enact a valid law
as an exercise of the police power, if its effect is to take the property of one group
and give it to another.20 There is, of course, always a presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of legislative acts,2 1 but constitutional restrictions alone determine
the validity of a statute without reference to any principles of natural equity or
10. Ibid. "Instead of solely taxing all the people directly [as under the dole system],
it [the legislature] has passed a law whereby employers are taxed for the help of
the unemployed, the sums thus paid being cast upon the public generally through the
natural increase in the prices of commodities?'
11. For a discussion of this realistic movement in the law, see Kennedy, Prindp!.es or
Facts? (1935) 4 FoRD Aar L. REv. 53; Kennedy, Functional Nonsense ard Ile Transcen-
dental Approach (1936) 5 FoanuAit L. Rnv. 272. But cj. Llewellyn, Some Realism about
Realism (1931) 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222; Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Func-
tional Approach (1935) 35 Cot.. L. REv. 809.
12. 297 U. S. 702 (1936).
13. 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
14. See W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 13, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 25-26
(1936).
15. Id. at 14, 15, 2 N. E. (2d) at 26.
16. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U. S. 36, 62 (1873) ; Stone v. M!" kdppi, 101 U. S.
814, 818 (1879).
17. New York & N. E. R. R. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 (1894); see Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U. S. 548, 558 (1914).
18. N. Y. LABoR LAw (1935) § 500.
19. See House v. Mayes, 219 U. S. 270, 282 (1911).
20. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. v. Smith, 173 U. S. 684 (1899); Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935); see Louisville joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 601-2 (1935); United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 61
(1936).
21. People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343 (1888).
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justice.22 The presumption extends to the findings of fact of the legislature, sub-
ject, however, to the limitation that the court must be able to discern a reasonable
basis for such findings and a substantial relation between the legislature's act and
the general public welfare.23
In the instant case, however, the court seems to be influenced more by the
judgment of the legislature than by the constitution. The majority accepts the
legislative findings with surprising alacrity in view of the fact that this is admitted
to be an experimental statute, of debatable value as a remedy or a relief for
unemployment. The effect is obviously taxation of the employers for the benefit
of a special class of the unemployed public which the legislature has selected to
receive benefits, and, as pointed out by the dissent, any benefit to the general
public is indirect and incidental.24 The court questions the wisdom of the provi-
sions allowing benefits, after the prescribed period of idleness, to employees who
have been discharged or have left their employment because of strikes, and granting
to unemployed persons the right to refuse other work when offered.26 In addition,
the dissent argues that the statute deals entirely with the effect of unemployment
with no provision to prevent or limit its spread; that it neither deals with the
causes of unemployment nor provides more employment; that its benefits are not
based upon need of financial assistance; and that, since it violates due process in
its main features, no part of the act can be sustained as an exercise of the police
power.2 6 Nevertheless, the majority discovers nothing "arbitrary or unreasonable"
in the legislative findings.
22. Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509 (1878); see People v. Buffalo Fish Co., 164
N. Y. 93, 97, 58 N. E. 34, 36 (1900).
23. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905); O'Gorman & Young, Inc. v.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 (1931).
24. See W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 23, 2 N. E. (2d) 22, 30
(1936). Only that portion of the unemployed who can meet the prescribed conditions
are eligible for benefits. N. Y. LABOR LAW (1935) §§ 503-506. See summary note 1,
supra.
25. See W. H. H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N. Y. 1, 14-15, 2 N. E. (2d) 22,
26 (1936).
26. Id. at 21-26, 2 N. E. (2d) at 29-31. The dissent also contends that the decision
in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (1935), is controlling in this
case. There the Railroad Retirement Act (48 Stat. 1283, 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 201-214
[1934)), pensioning a certain class of railroad employees, was held unconstitutional, the
dissent argues, on the grounds: first, that it did not constitute a regulation of interstate
commerce, and second, that it violated the due process clause. The majority agrees
with the first interpretation but contends that the act could not be sustained as an exer-
cise of' the police power because no such power exists in the federal government. It has
been suggested that the Railway Pension case placed an unnecessary interpretation on the
commerce clause and that the act was really condemned because of inseparable provisions,
concerning the classes of persons to be benefited, distasteful to majority conceptions of
due process of law. But since both opinions considered the statute wholly as a regu-
latory one, without invoking the taxing power as an aid to the regulatory power, neither
opinion touches directly upon the issues involved in social security legislation. See Powell,
Commerce, Pensions and Codes (1935) 49 HARv. L. REV. 1; cf. (1935) 4 FORDMAX L. Ray.
498. Thus, in spite of the fact that in the New York Unemployment Insurance Law,
contributions from all employers covered by the statute are pooled in one fund, the
majority in the instant case would seem to be right in holding that the Pension case is
not applicable. The provision in the Pension Law pooling carriers and employees In a
unitary plan was condemned, but for precedents that seem to sanction It, see Noble
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During the depression, emergencies have arisen which required the exercise of
the police power as the court points out, citing People ex rel. Durhamn Realty Corp.
v. La Fetra27 Adler v. Deegan,28 and People v. Nebbia.2 9  But these cases seem
to hold that the legislature has the reserve power to deal with an emergency after
it arises and would appear to be doubtful authority for the exercise of this power
in an experimental attempt to anticipate an unpredictable future emergency. The
fact is that unemployment has come to be generally regarded as a permanent social
problem, prevalent in good times as well as bad. Present attempts to insure against
it are recognized as adequate for little more than normal conditions, and completely
inadequate for depression times when mass unemployment is prevalent30 This law,
therefore, should not be treated in any sense as an emergency measure.
Since present state unemployment insurance statutes are necessarily experimental,'
it is submitted that there is danger that enthusiasm for this new type of social
insurance legislation may result in blanket approval of particular laws without regard
for possible defects. Whether or not the Federal Social Security Act 2 is consti-
tutional is still an unsettled question. Hence state laws, passed to conform with
it,-3  require careful judicial scrutiny. The tolerant attitude of this court in
State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911) and Able State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U. S.
765 (1931) (pooling banks in the depositors' guarantee plan); Mountain Timber Co.
v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1917) (pooling classes of hazardous industries in the
Washington workmen's compensation plan); New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184
(1923) (division of joint rates on other bases than that of mileage); Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456 (1924) (recapture of excess earnings of rail-
roads).
27. 230 N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921) (rent laws).
28. 251 N. Y. 467, 167 N. E. 705 (1929) (housing laws).
29. 262 N. Y. 259, 186 N. E. 694 (1933) (milk laws).
30. See Unemployment Compensation, (a symposium) (1936) 3 Liw & Cozwrmr.
PROB. 1-169; DouorAs, ST .L-DARns or UNrmPLoY'Mr.N L suan.cc (1933) 2; Er=r., ID.-
sEcu =aT, A CMALENGE o A r cA (1933); Legis. (1935) 4 FoRDnAX L. Rnv. 485, 486.
31. European systems of unemployment insurance have been evolving for years and
are now well established. But in the United States such laws are of very recent origin.
Until 1935 Wisconsin was the only state having an unemployment insurance law and
that was enacted in 1931. For a discussion of European systems and the development
of unemployment insurance in the United States, see Legis. (1935) 4 Fonm~r L. Rzv.
485, 486.
32. 49 SxAT. 619, 42 U. S. C. A. § 301 (1935).
33. The federal statute does not set up an unemployment insurance system. Rather, it
taxes employers throughout the country, and by the use of the tax offset device, attempts
to induce the individual states to pass cooperating unemployment insurance laws. Unde
the federal act, employers' contributions to a state fund are credited to payments due
the national fund, thus eliminating competitive advantages that might accrue to indus-
tries in states having no state law. Minimum standards in the state plans are assured
by making the operation of the tax off-set provision conditional on compliance with pre-
scribed federal requirements. The New York law substantially meets the standards
specified by the federal act so that the tax offset provision should be available to New
York employers. However, their satisfaction in this fact will be tempered somewhat
by a significant difference in the method of calculating the tax under the New York
law and under the federal act. In New York, employers' compulsory contributions are
calculated only on the total wages paid to insured employees-manual workers and non-
manual workers who receive $50 a week or less. But the federal tax on employers i3
levied on the total payroll including salaries of executives and other better paid em-
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accepting the findings of the legislature in their entirety would seem to encourage
the adoption of constitutionally doubtful and, perhaps, ill-considered legislative
provisions-thus possibly endangering the ultimate success of the movement in
this country.
CRIMINAL LAW-WAIVER OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL NUMBER OF, JuRoRs.-The
defendant was indicted for a felony. During the trial one of the jurors became so
ill that it was necessary to dismiss him. The defendant, being fully informed of
his rights to have a new jury called, consented to continue with eleven men. Upon
conviction he petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, contending
that he was being unlawfully detained since his waiver of the right to trial by a
jury of twelve was void. On appeal from a judgment denying the petition, hold,
an accused may affirmatively waive trial by a jury of twelve with the consent of
the prosecuting attorney and the sanction of the court. Judgment affirmed. State
ex rel. Kortgaard v. Patterson, 267 N. W. 438 (N. D. Sup. Ct. 1936).
The right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Federal' and State2 constitutions
refers to that right as it was understood and applied at common law, and includes
all the essentials of a common law jury as recognized in this country and in England
at the time the constitution was adopted. Such a jury was composed of twelve
men, 3 sitting in the presence and under the direction of a judge having the necessary
power and authority to advise them concerning the facts and to instruct them on
all points of law involved in the issue. 4 The exact origin of the number twelve
is shrouded in the mists of antiquity5 and it is generally regarded as an arbitrary
figure 6 only so fixed because of the necessity for some numerical limitation.7
ployees who are not eligible for benefits. Since the plan is designed solely for the pro-
tection of small wage earners, it is claimed that the prindples underlying unemployment
insurance do not sanction such a tax. See Gray, op. cit. supra note 1, at 39.
1. U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, d. 3; Amdt. VI; Amdt. VII.
2. See, e.g., CoNN. CoNsT. art. I, § 9; MAss. CoNsT. part I, art. XII § 13; N. C. CONST.
art. I, §§ 13, 19; N. Y. CoNsT. art I, § 2; OKLA. CoNsT. art. II, § 19; PA. CoNsT. art.
I, § 6.
3. "When Magna Charta dictated that no freeman should be deprived of his life,
etc., 'but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land,' it referred to a trial
by twelve jurors." Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343, 349 (1898). "The jurors having
been duly returned, and sworn without objection, the legal presumption is, that they
were twelve good men and true." Turns v. Commonwealth, 47 Mass. 224, 235 (1843);
Branham v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489 (1925); 1 CooLEY, CoNsTITru-
TroxNAL LImIrATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 674.
4. "Trial in the courts of the United States is a trial presided over by a judge .... .
United States v. Philadelphia & Reading R. R., 123 U. S. 113, 114 (1887); Freeman v.
United States, 227 Fed. 732 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); Smith v. Atlantic & G. W. R. R., 25
Ohio St. 91, 102 (1874).
5. See People v. Cosmo, 205 N. Y. 91, 96, 98 N. E. 408, 409 (1912), where the court
said, "From time immemorial a common law jury has consisted of twelve men."
6. During the reign of William the Conqueror, Odo, Bishop of Bayeux, chose a jury
of twelve. However, it was not until the reign of Henry II that such a custom became
general. 1 REEVES, HISTORY Or TH ENGLISH LAw (2d ed. 1787) 84. For a brief history
of the development of the jury, see THAYER, A PE.MrNARYv TRE sT - ON Evwnw=
(1898) 47-182.
7. 1 HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 325.
RECENT DECISIONS
There is no doubt that a jury trial may be waived by the parties litigant in civil
cases.8 Obviously, however, a vast difference exists between civil and criminal
cases regarding the legal right of the accused to waive a strict observance of the
established rules of judicial procedure; this arises out of the very nature of the
conflicting interests involved and the ends to be attained.
As a general rule it is not permissible for a defendant in a criminal action to
waive the right to trial by jury, either because the statutes relating to trial by jury
are construed to be mandatory,' 0 or because no express provision is made by
statute for such waiver." The rule at common law was that there could be no
waiver of a jury trial.' 2 The main bone of contention today is whether the
constitutional clauses in respect to trial by jury merely guarantee a right to the
accused, or have established a jury tribunal as part of the governmental framework.
It would seem that if trial by jury is a right it may be waived, since constitutional
as well as statutory rights can be waived; 3 whereas if it is a governmental fixture
it may not be dispensed with even with the consent of the accused. Trial by jury
has always been regarded as a right and a privilege.14 It has been said that it is
as absolute right conferred by the state but which is not to be forced upon a
defendant.' 5 The refusal to allow a defendant to dispense with trial by jury in
a criminal action is no longer universal and the tendency has been to allow it.10 In
8. Lyman v. Kaul, 275 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 944 (1916); Citizens' Gas Light Co. v.
Wakefield, 161 Mass. 432, 37 N. E. 444 (1894); Baird v. Mayor of the City of New York,
74 N. Y. 382 (1878). In some jurisdictions, it is expressly allowed by statute. Se, e.g.,
46 STAT. 486 (1930), 28 U. S. C. A. § 773 (1935); PA. SzrT. Am. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 12,
§ 688. In some states, constitutional provisions cover this waiver. N. Y. Cot-sr. art. I,
§ 2; Oaro Coxsr. art. V, § 27.
9. But cf. Commonwealth v. Dailey, 66 Mass. 80, 83 (1853) where the court in effect
said that the defendant could waive any matter of form or substance excepting only what
may relate to the jurisdiction of the court.
10. Branham v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489 (1925); Neals v. State,
10 Mo. *498 (1847); Commonwealth v. Hall, 291 Pa. 341, 140 At. 626 (1928); State
v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664, 200 N. W. 638 (1924).
11. Wilson v. State, 16 Ark. *601 (1855) (held error when court entered a plea of
not guilty and tried the defendant without a jury on his refusal to make any plea);
State v. Carman, 63 Iowa 130, 18 N. W. 691 (18S4); Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb.
761, 101 N. W. 1007 (1904); Mays v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 550 (1886).
12. Harris v. People, 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563 (1889); Neals v. State, 10 Mo. *498
(1847).
13. Jones v. Oklahoma City, 78 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935); see Matter of
Cooper, 93 N. Y. 507, 512 (1883) where the court said, "it is very well Eettled that a
party may waive a statutory and even a constitutional provision made for his benefit
and that having once done so, he cannot afterwards ask for its protection." But see
Cameron v. International etc. Union No. 384, 118 N. f. Eq. 11, 176 At. 692 (1935),
in which the court said that an individual could not surrender fundamental rights if
the public interest would thereby be prejudiced. 1 Coorzy, op. cit. supra note 3. at 363-
371.
14. 3 BL. Coans. *349; 2 SroRy, TnE CoNsTruTiToi § 1779 (5th ed. 1891).
15. See People v. Fisher 340 Ill. 250, 255, 172 N. E. 722, 728 (1930); State v. White,
33 La. Ann. 1218, 1219 (1881) wherein the court in substance says that the right is merely
placed beyond the reach of any governmental agency and secures but does not bind a
defendant.
16. People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930); Ex parte King, 42 Okla. Cr.
46, 274 Pac. 682 (1929); State v. Harvey, 117 Ore. 466, 242 Pac. 440 (1926). Some
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some jurisdictions this has been accomplished by statute.1T
While many jurisdictions do allow the waiver of a jury, in whole or in part, and
effectively dispose of the argument that it is against public policy,18 nevertheless the
view which will allow no waiver of any kind seems to have a better basis in law.
Certainly if a state constitution definitely sets up trial by jury as the sole basis
for conviction,10 there should be no waiver of any kind. Even where the constitution
reads, "the right to trial by jury", or similar words,20 those cases which refuse a
waiver may be justified since it is a well established rule that constitutional provi-
sions are to be interpreted in the light and by the assistance of the common law,21
which permitted no waiver. The constitutional provisions which, in many instances,
expressly extend to civil cases only,2 2 are not authority for granting the right of
waiver to a defendant in a criminal action.
There is much difference of opinion among the authorities concerning the right
of the accused to be tried before a jury not of constitutional numbers, even with
his full consent.2 3  Certainly if the defendant can completely forego a jury, it
jurisdictions have made a distinction and allow a waiver in misdemeanor cases but forbid
it in the case of felonies. Guess v. State, 6 Ark. 147 (1845). Cf. Phipps v. Common-
wealth, 205 Ky. 832, 266 S. W. 651 (1924); Miller v. State, 116 Neb. 702, 218 N. W. 743
(1928), where a misdemeanor is punishable by fine only. There seems to be no reason
for this distinction and there is no basis for the argument that public policy dictates such
reasoning due to the more serious consequences attendant upon conviction for a felony.
See Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 309 (1930). This distinction falls to convince
because the law does not show a degree of interest in the protection of its citizens
dependent upon the gravity of the crime with which they are charged. See Commonwealth
v. Beard, 48 Pa. Super. 319, 323-324 (1911).
17. Ar.A. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1928) § 8598 (whereby the court is authorized to try
all misdemeanors unless the defendant demands a jury in writing); CONN. GEN. STAT.
(1930) § 6477; MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 27, § 549 (whereby the defendant may
waive trial by jury in all criminal cases); MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 263, § 6 (which
provides for written waiver of the jury. Prior to the amendment of this section, the
courts refused to allow a waiver of trial by jury; Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass.
172, 153 N. E. 537 [19261). It is interesting to note that the New York Legislature
passed a concurrent resolution to amend Art. I, § 2 of the State Constitution so as to
allow a waiver of the jury in all criminal cases except those in which the crime charged
is punishable by death. This resolution has not yet been referred to the Legislature
a second time as required by art. XIV, § 1, of the constitution. See Concurrent Reso-
lutions, N. Y. Laws 1935, Appendix at 1917.
18. Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930); Commonwealth v. Dailey, 66
Mass. 80 (1853); Ex parte King, 42 Okla. Cr. 46, 274 Pac. 682 (1929); In re Staff, 63
Wis. 285, 23 N. W. 587 (1885).
19. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 10; IND. CONsT. art. I, § 64; N. C. CoNsT. art. I, § 13 ("No
person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good
and lawful men in open court. The Legislature may, however, provide other means of
trial for petty misdemeanor with the right of appeal.").
20. CONN. CoNsT. art. I, § 9; Nm. CoNsT. art. I, § 6; OmIo CoNSr. art. I, § 5; PA.
CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
21. 1 CooLEY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 133.
22. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 5; N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
23. The following cases allowed a partial waiver of the jury: Patton v. United States,
281 U. S. 276 (1930); State v. Browman, 191 Iowa 608, 182 N. W. 823 (1921); Com-
monwealth v. Lawless, 258 Mass. 262, 154 N. E. 753 (1927); State v. Sackett, 39 Minn.
69, 38 N. W. 773 (1888); State v. Borowsky, 11 Nev. *119 (1876); State v. Baer, 103
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would appear that he should be permitted to waive part of it, and any distinction
between waiving a jury in toto and dispensing with it in part, should be rejected
since a constitutional jury exists only if there are twelve members.2
Where there are no constitutional or statutory provisions allowing such waiver,
as in the instant jurisdiction, it is submitted that for the reasons above, waiver of
a jury should not be allowed in criminal actions.
PLEDGES-DUTY OF PLEDGEE TO SELL UPON PLnEGoR's DmuAwD.-The defendant
pledged $50,000 worth of stock as security for a demand note of $18,000 held by
the plaintiff bank. Due to the constant downward trend of the stock's market value,
the defendant several times requested the bank to sell it when the proceeds of such
sale would have more than liquidated the loan. The plaintiff refused, fearing that
the placing of this block on the market would disastrously affect the value of
similar securities pledged by other borrowers. The collateral was finally sold when
its value was insufficient to meet the loan, and suit was brought for the balance.
The defendant counterclaimed upon the theory that the bank was negligent in not
complying with the request to sell. On appeal from a judgment for the defendant,
held, four judges dissenting, that a pledgee is under no legal obligation to sell
collateral at the pledgors request. Judgment reversed. Fran.litt Trust Co. v.
Goerke, 116 N. J. L. 529, 185 At. 39 (1936).
A pledgee is to some extent a trustee and, therefore, has the duty to act in the
interest of the pledgor as well as in his own behalf.1 For example, a creditor
holding pledged collateral is bound to use that ordinary care; which a reasonably
prudent man should have exercised under the same circumstances, in order to
preserve the pledge physically.3  In the field of pledged commercial paper, it has
Ohio St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (1921) (if the defendant by pleading guilty can waive any
trial, it necessarily follows that he can waive trial by a constitutional jury); Common-
wealth v. Egan, 281 Pa. 251, 126 Atl. 488 (1924); State v. Tiedeman, 49 S. D. 356, 207
N. W. 153 (1926). Contra: Hill v. People, 16 Mich. 351 (1683); State v. Mansfield, 41
Mo. 470 (1867); State v. Rogers, 162 N. C. 656, 78 S. E. 293 (1913); Cancemi v. People,
18 N. Y. 128 (1858) (holding that such a waiver is against public policy); State v.
Hall, 137 S. C. 261, 101 S. E. 662 (1919); Dunn v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 21, 224 S. W.
893 (1920); State v. Ellis, 22 Wash. 129, 60 Pac. 136 (1900); Jennings v. State, 134 Wis.
307, 114 N. W. 492 (1908).
24. See Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276, 290, 292 (1930); Cf. State v. Kaufman,
51 Iowa 578, 2 N. W. 275 (1879) (allows a partial waiver of the jury); State v. Rea,
126 Iowa 65, 101 N. W. 507 (1904) (refuses a waiver of the entire jury).
1. Gillet v. Bank of America, 160 N. Y. 549, 55 N. E. 292 (1899); Plucker v. Teller,
174 Pa. 529, 34 Atl. 208 (1896); see Union Trust Co. v. Long, 309 Pa. 470, 477, 164
Atl. 346, 348 (1932).
2. Whether the pledgee has exercised due diligence is a jury question. Park v. Swarm,
20 Ga. App. 39, 92 S. E. 398 (1917); Benjamin N. Moore & Sons Co. v. Manufacturers'
Nat. Bank, 261 Mass. 328, 158 N. E. 755 (1927); Willetts v. Hatch, 132 N. Y. 41, 30
N. E. 251 (1892).
3. Preston v. Prather, 137 U. S. 604 (1891); Moore v. Manufacturers' Nat. Bank, 261
Mass. 328, 158 N. E. 755 (1927) (pledgee while exhibiting pledged leather allowed pros-
pective buyers to walk upon it so as to cause deterioration); Ouderkirk v. Central Nat.
Bank, 119 N. Y. 263, 23 N. E. 875 (1890) (bank liable for disappeaance of pledged bonds
on proof it had not cared for them as for its own); Toplitz v. Bauer, 161 N. Y, 325,
55 N. E. 1059 (1900).
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been held that the pledgee is negligent if he does not take the ordinary steps to
charge an indorser upon default. 4
According to the general view, a pledgee who has a mere discretion to sell need
not watch the market but may remain passive whether the value of the security falls
or rises, and he is not liable for any loss suffered.5 There is a wide divergence
of opinion as to whether the pledgee owes a duty of compliance where there has
been a request by the pledgor to sell.0 It would seem to be the weight of authority
that in the absence of contract, the pledgee is under no duty to sell, even when
requested to do so by the pledgor, and is not liable for any losses resulting from
a refusal. 7 On the other hand, the proposition that the pledgor may cast the duty
on his pledgee to sell by a request to do so, finds support in some cases.8 This
appears to be the better rule as the main purpose of the pledge is to insure to
the pledgee the repayment of the loan,0 and it is obvious that there is no further
need for protection when he can be fully remunerated by the requested sale. It
would seem, that when there is a request and the pledgee arbitrarily refuses to
sell fluctuating stock for selfish reasons, it is unjust that he should not be liable to
the pledgor for all resulting losses. In such a case, it is evident that the pledgee
is completely disregarding the pledgor's interest as owner of the property. It is
common knowledge among business men that it is customary for a bank, having
security against a loan, to accede to a request to sell under circumstances where
the loan will be completely satisfied as a result of the sale. In a case previously
decided by the instant court it was intimated that under facts similar to the case
at bar, the pledgee would be liable.' 0 It might also be argued that in principle,
4. Easton v. German-American Bank, 24 Fed. 523 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1885); Robertson
v. First Nat. Bank, 67 Colo. 517, 186 Pac. 542 (1920); Buckingham v. Payne, 36 Barb.
81 (N. Y. 1861).
5. Culver v. Wilkinson, 145 U. S. 205 (1892); Lake v. Little Rock Trust Co., 77 Ark.
53, 90 S. W. 847 (1905); Howell v. Dimock, 15 App. Div. 102, 44 N. Y. Supp. 271
(2d Dep't 1897); Adoue & Lobit v. Hutches, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 559, 75 S. W. 41 (1903).
6. In an analogous situation it has been held that the mortgagor cannot compel the
mortgagee to foreclose his mortgage. Crowson v. Cody, 209 Ala. 674, 96 So. 875 (1923);
Neely v. Black, 80 Ark. 212, 96 S. W. 984 (1906); White v. Lucas, 46 Iowa 319 (1877). In
Marsh v. Pike, 10 Paige 595 (N. Y. 1844) the mortgagor had sold the mortgaged premises
to a third party who had promised to pay the bond and mortgage and had not done
so. The decision is sound as the mortgagor had the right in equity to compel such sub-
sequent grantee, as to whom he is in a position of a surety, to discharge the debt.
7. People's Bank v. Mendenhall, 154 Ark. 282, 243 S. W. 805 (1922); First Nat, Bank
v. Hattaway, 172 Ga. 731, 158 S. E. 565 (1931) (pledgee not liable for refusal to sell
pledged cotton even though there was subsequently a large drop in the market price);
Conlew Inc. v. Newman, 240 App. Div. 511. 270 N. Y. Supp. 695 (1st Dep't 1934).
But where the refusal was in bad faith the pledgee has been held liable. Napier v. Cen-
tral Ga. Bank, 68 Ga. 637 (1882) (pledgee liable as it refused to sell pledged stock
in attempt to manipulate stock's market value).
8. Union Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Pitts, 176 Mo. 134, 161 S. W. 1182 (1914);
O'Neill v. Whigham, 87 Pa. 394 (1878); Adoue & Lobit v. Hutches, 32 Tex. Civ. App.
559, 75 S. W. 41 (1903).
9. Minge v. Clarke, 193 Ala. 447, 69 So. 421 (1915); Robertson v. First Nat. Bank,
67 Colo. 517, 186 Pac. 542 (1920).
10. See People's Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Ginsburg, 108 N. J. L. 415, 418, 156 Atl. 491,
92 (1931) (pledgor had requested a sale of the pledged stock and the pledgee re-
fused. The court based its decision for the pledgee on the ground that the sale's proceeds




the doctrine of Pain v. Packard'1 should forestall recovery by the plaintiff here.
In that case, a holder of a demand note, who could have secured payment when
the maker was solvent, neglected to do so despite the urging of the surety and was,
therefore, denied recovery against the latter. Why should not the holder, in the
case under discussion, be blocked from securing payment from the maker when be
was urged to satisfy his claim by selling the then sufficient collateral? Furthermore,
in the principal case the plaintiff's whole course of conduct seems to be characterized
by such bad faith and faulty use of discretion that to exempt it from liability is
unjust to the pledgor.12 A manifestly different situation would have obtained had
the proceeds been insufficient to pay the debt.
It is submitted that it would be more equitable in these cases to hold that there
is a duty owed by the pledgee to use at least reasonable discretion in refusing to
liquidate security on a pledgors request and that the question of reasonableness
should be resolved by the jury upon a consideration of all the facts.
REAL PROPERTY-EASEMENTS-EFFECT ON PRESCRIPTION OF CHANGE IN STATU-
TORY PERIOD REQUIRED FOR ADVERSE PossEsSIoN.-A suit was brought for damages
to easements of light, air, and access caused by the maintenance and operation by
the defendant of an elevated railway structure. The defendant in his answer set
up the Statute of Limitations which, as amended,' reduced the period within which
actions to recover real property may be brought from twenty to fifteen years. The
sole question before the court was whether the change in the Statute should be
extended so as to apply to incorporeal hereditaments. On appeal from a judg-
ment of the Appellate Division, affirming a judgment of the Special Term granting a
motion by the plaintiff to strike out such defense, held, that the statutory change
affecting corporeal rights correspondingly reduced the period within which prescrip-
tive rights may be acquired in real property. Judgment reversed. Kin Co. v. New
York Rapid Transit Corp., 271 N. Y. 376, 3 N. E. (2d) 516 (1936).
Regarded historically, prescription is merely a branch of the law of custom. 2  A
prescription was originally conceived of as a personal custom,3 one that was limited
to a particular person and his ancestors or predecessors in title. In order to
establish a prescriptive right, a litigant had to prove that his enjoyment and pos-
11. 13 Johns: *174 (N. Y. 1816).
12. It is interesting to note a point made by the majority, that perhaps the pledgor
was careless in not attempting to sell the stock through a broker, even though it was in
the bank's possession, and then compelling transfer by a tender of the amount due on the
note. It would seem, however, that the pledgor would have no reason to believe that
the bank would be willing to deliver the stock to a broker when it had refused to sell
for him.
1. N. Y. Cry. PxAc. AcT (1921) §§ 34-37, as amended by N. Y. Laws, 1932, cc. 261-
264.
2. "Prescription and Custom are brothers, and ought to have the same age, and
Reason ought to be the Father, and Congruence the Mother, and Use the nurse, and
time out of memory to fortifie them both." Coke, C. J., in Rowles v. Mason, 2 Browvnl.
192, 198, 123 Eng. Reprints 892, 895 (C. P. 1612); Warrick v. Queen's College, L. R.
10 Eq. 105 (1870).
3. It was distinguished from a local custom in that the latter was limited to an indi-
vidual place or locality, not to a particular person. Mercer v. Denne [1904] 2 Ch.
534; Clarkson v. Woodhouse, 5 T. R. 413, n., 101 Eng. Reprints 231, n. (K. B. 1786).
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session of the right had continued from immemorial antiquity.4 The method of
adducing such proof was by producing a witness who could testify that at all times
within his memory,6 or the memory of his father, who had enjoined him to testify
to the fact, the claimant of the adverse right had enjoyed continual possession
thereof. The practical application of this rule occasioned much inconvenience in that
it left the rights of parties dependent to a great extent on the longevity of
witnesses. With a view to removing this uncertainty, without materially enlarging or
abridging such rights, statutes6 were passed in the course of time which fixed
certain dates as the starting point of legal memory, and evidence of possession or
enjoyment of land from those dates was regarded as conclusive proof of immemorial
ownership. It must be observed that none of these enactments was applicable to
actions in which.the right to incorporeal hereditaments was involved. The courts,
however, by analogy to these statutes, arbitrarily applied these dates to actions
involving incorporeal rights in land. 7 As these fixed dates became more remot6 with
the passage of time, the salutary effect of this legislation was vitiated. To obviate
the difficulties in proof which thus came about, the courts in actions involving
incorporeal hereditaments showed themselves willing conclusively to presume an
enjoyment from time immemorial if evidence could be offered to show an enjoy-
ment from time of living memory.8 Subsequently, to meet the same difficulties of
proof which likewise arose in the field of corporeal hereditaments, the Statute of
Henry was passed,9 which fixed the period of sixty years as the time limit within
which an action could be brought to recover a fee adversely possessed. However,
the courts did not think it practical to make an analogous use of this statute in
actions in which the right to incorporeal hereditaments was involved. The courts,
memory was less than sixty years. At a later time, when the period within which
a writ of right could be brought was reduced to twenty years, 10 the courts were
4. The requirement of immemorial antiquity in respect to custom and prescription
was introduced into the English law courts of the twelfth century from the Canon
law, which in turn had derived it from the Civil law. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENcE (8th ed.
1930) 222 et seq.
S. The introduction of the rule of immemorial antiquity was coincident with that of
the introduction of the trial by jury in actions involving writs of right. In those early
days, the twelve men composing the jury were witnesses of fact and they were expected
to give personal evidence from their own knowledge of all matters relative to the trial
of the action. But the extent of this testimony was limited by a rule of evidence which
prevented the adduction of anything as proof unless it had happened within time of
memory. Consequently, if the status quo could be proved to have existed since the
time of memory, it was deemed to have existed immemorially. Ashford, Legal Memory
(1932) 73 LoND o L. J. 377, 392, 409; for an account of the origin and history of legal
memory see note to Cassidy v. Steuart, 2 Man. & G. 437, 466-469, 133 Eng. Reprints
817, 831-833 (C. P. 1841).
6. The first fixed epoch appears to have been the date of the accession of Henry I,
Aug. 1, 1100. There were subsequently passed the Statute of Merton, 1235, 20 HEN. III,
c. 8, fixing the date of the coronation of Henry II (Oct. 20, 1154), and then the Statute
of Westminster, 1275, 3 EDW. I, c. 39, fixing the date of the commencement of the reign
of Richard I (1189), as the dates of legal memory. Note to Cassidy v, Steuart, 2 Man.
& G. 437, 466, 133 Eng. Reprints 817, 831 (1841).
7. See Angus v. Dalton, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 85, 104 (1877), per Cockburn, C. J.; TYFANy,
RxA PROP. (1903) § 445.
8. See Angus v. Dalton, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 85, 104 (1877); 2 STEPHEN'S CoiMM. (19th ed.
1928) 75.
9. 32 HzNl. VIII, c. 2 (1540).
10. 21 JAC. I, c. 16 (1623).
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again reluctant to apply the analogy to incorporeal hereditaments but they accom-
plished the same end by adopting the fiction that a grant11 of right would be con-
clusively presumed' 2 if it had been exercised for a period of twenty years. 3  In
America, the courts early recognized and applied this doctrine of lost grant as one
of the principles of the common law.14
In the instant case, the lower courtslu reasoned that the failure of the legislature
specifically to include incorporeal rights in the terms of the new statute must be
taken as indicative of a legislative intent to leave the period formerly applicable
to such rights unabridged. Such an argument is generally not without weight. How-
ever, here it ignores the history and policy behind the time-honored practice of the
Anglo-American courts to conform the period requisite to acquire an adverse in-
corporeal right in another's land to that prescribed by the Statute of Limitations to
11. See Angus v. Dalton, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 85, 104 (1877); Bright v. Walker, 1 C. Li.
R. 211, 217, 149 Eng. Reprints 1057, 1060 (Ex. 1834) ; Tm,W, L Pnop. (1903) § 44S;
WASHBURN, EAsEmTS (4th ed.) §§ 125, 126. It was called a lost grant, not to indicate
that the fact of the existence of the grant originally was of importance, but to avoid,
the rule of pleading requiring profert. Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Mc.Farlan, 43 N. J. L.
605, 617 (1881).
12. "Presumptions of this nature are adopted from the general infirmity of human
nature, the difficulty of preserving muniments of title, and the public policy of sup-
porting long and uninterrupted possession. '  Per Story, J., Rickard v. Willhms. 20
U. S. 59, 108 (1822). Whethe the presumption exercised in the doctrine of lost grant
was arbitrary, or whether it was merely permissive, was a question on which the courts
were much in dispute in the early days of the doctrine's introduction. However, the
later cases, with practical unanimity, definitely settled the conclusiveness of the character
of the presumption. Angus v. Dalton, L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 162 (1878), aff'd, 6 App. Cas. 740
(1881) ; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East 203, 215, 102 Eng. Reprints 1266, 1269 (K. B. 180S);
Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 Fed. Cas. 14, 312 (C. C. R. I. 1827). The courts held that the
presumption arising from the uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement operated as an
estoppel by conduct, and consequently, the fact that no grant of the easement had been
made was immaterial. Lehigh Valley R. R. v. McFarlan, 43 N. J. L. 605 (1831).
13. In England, with the view of giving legislative sanction to the doctrine of lost
grant and of removing the inconveniences of the common law rules, the Prescription
Act (1832) was passed. It, unfortunately, is an extreme example of legislative in-
competence, and has failed to produce the simplification of the law that was needed.
In fact, the modern practice is to plead alternative claims of prescription by statute,
prescription at common law, and lost modern grant. 2 STrEmnzs CoM.. (19th ed.) 80;
SAL-moND, JumaRuDuNzcE (8th ed. 1930) 223.
14. Rickard v. Williams, 20 U. S. 59, 108 (1822); Sherwood v. Burr, 4 Day 244, 4 Am.
Dec. 211 (Conn. 1810); Hill v. Crosby, 19 Mass. 466 (1824); Coolidge v. Learned,
8 Pick. 504 (Mlass. 1829); Melvin v. Whiting, 27 Mass. 295 (1830); Cobb v. Davenport,
32 N. 3. L. 369 (1867); Lehigh Valley R. R. v. McFarlan, 43 N. 1. L. 605 (1881); Parker
v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 (N. Y. 1838); Ward v. Warren, 82 N. Y. 265 (18RO); O!eon
v. Patterson, 29 Pa. St. 22 (1857). Cf. Ferrell v. Ferrell, 1 Baxt. 329 (Tenn. 1872)
(peculiar controlling statutes); Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah 238, 61 Pac. 1006 (1900)
(where sought to establish title to prescriptive right to incorporeal hereditament by pre-
sumption of grant, analogous to statute, facts from which presumption arises under statute
must be shown to exist).
15. Klin Co. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 247 App. Div. 817, 288 N. Y. Supp.
727 (2d Dep't 1936), affirming a judgment of the Special Term on the authority of Fd-
berose Holding Corp. v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 244 App. Div. 427, 279 N. Y.
Supp. 645 (2ai Dep't 1935).
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quiet title to realty by adverse possession. Thus, considered in the light of history,
policy, and precedent, the court in the principal case can find ample justification
for its decision.
TORTS-RIGHT OF INSURER OF ONE JOINT TORTFEASOR TO CONTRIBUTION
FROM THE OTHER JOINT TORTFEASR.-In a former action the plaintiff's insured
was adjudged li able for injuries received by a passenger in the defendant's auto-
mobile due to a collision with a car operated by plaintiff's insured. In that action,
the defendant also recovered a judgment for damages to his person and property
but on appeal this was reversed on the ground that the defendant was guilty of
contributory negligence.1 The plaintiff paid to the passenger the amount of the
judgment recovered against its insured. The present action was initiated for the
purpose of making the defendant pay to the plaintiff one half of said judgment on
the ground that the plaintiff's insured and the defendant were both guilty of
negligence and that tortfeasors are equally liable for the damages caused by their
negligence. On appeal from a judgment sustaining defendant's exception that no
cause of action was stated, held, that joint tortfeasors cannot enforce contribution
from each other. Plaintiff, as insurer of a joint tortfeasor, stands in no better
position than its insured. Judgment affirmed. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dejean,
167 So. 864 (La. Ct. of App. 1936).
The right to contribution is based on the principle that persons having a common
interest in a subject matter shall bear equally any burden affecting it.2 If a judg-
ment is satisfied by one of those jointly liable, he is deemed entitled to a contri-
bution from the rest of their proportionate share. But the leading case of Merry-
weather v. Nixan,3 which denied the right to contribution as between tortfeasors,
has come to be regarded as the general rule,4 and has been followed by the majority
of our courts. 5 Among the reasons assigned for this denial of the right to contribu-
tion is that it will operate as a punishment for the wrongdoers and thus will have a
deterrent effect on further wrongdoing inasmuch as any one of the tortfeasors may
become liable for the whole damage. 6 It has also been claimed that the courts
should not litigate matters between wrongdoers. 7 But it must be remembered that
the case of Merryweather v. Nixan was decided when all torts were regarded as
1. Sandoz v. Beridon, 150 So. 25 (La. Ct. of App. 1933).
2. In re Toole, 274 Fed. 337 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Willmon v. Koyer, 168 Cal. 369,
143 Pac. 694 (1914); Asylum of St. Vincent De Paul v. McGuire, 239 N. Y. 375, 146
N. E. 632 (1925); McCiTocx, EQUITY (1936) § 197.
3. 8 T. R. 186, 101 Eng. Reprints 1337 [K. B. 17991.
4. It is really an exception to the general rule which allows contribution. Reath,
Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan
(1898) 12 HARv. L. Rxv. 176, 177.
5. Union Stock Yards v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., 196 U. S. 217 (1905);
Turner v. Kirkwood, 49 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Cosgrove v. Ellensteln, 114
N. J. L. 155, 176 AtI. 178 (1935); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582,
173 N. E. 194 (1930); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25, 267 Pae. 641
(1928).
6. See Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131, 137 (N. Y. 1816); Pierson v. Thompson, 1 Edw.
Ch. 211, 217 (N. Y. 1831); Thweat v. Jones, 1 Rand. 328, 333, 10 Am. Dec. 538, 541 (Va.
1823).
7. See Vandiver v. Pollak, 107 Ala. 547, 19 So. 180, 182 (1895); Newman v. Fowler,
37 N. J. L. 89, 90 (1874); Moore & Savage v. Kopplin, 135 S. W. 1033, 1038 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911). 1 Coo.y, TORTS (3d ed. 1906) 254.
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intentional wrongs.8  The denial of the right to contribution as between unin-
tentional9 tortfeasors by most courts seems to be an unwarranted extension of the
principle of the Merryweather case and is unsupported by the reasons advanced for
the rule. It is submitted that the rule denying contribution as between tortfeasors
should be abolished, or, at least, it should be applied only when the tortfeasor wvas
acting wilfully. This last distinction has been recognized by some courts which
have allowed tortfeasors to recover contribution in negligence cases.20 Furthermore,
the right to contribution is essential to prevent injustice inasmuch as under the
present majority rule one tortfeasor may be forced to bear more than his propor-
tionate share of the burden. The importance of being fair to all parties subjected
to a common liability should not be ignored.11 In the instant case, the plaintiff
was denied contribution because its position was no better than that of its insured.
The negligence of each of the tortfeasors was based upon the fact that plaintiff's
insured and the defendant were each guilty of a violation of a statutory traffic
regulation. In such circumstances, tortfeasors do not deserve punishment for their
wrong, by denying the one recovery from the other. Fairness and justice would
seem to require that they should both share the damages. Granting, for the sake
of argument, that plaintiff's insured should be denied contribution as against the
defendant in such a situation, the court was nevertheless here presented with an
excellent opportunity to circumvent the strict common law rule of non-contribution.
The plaintiff was innocent of any wrong and untainted by the tort of its insured.
Sureties of tortfeasors have been permitted to obtain contribution when the tort-
feasors themselves would have been denied relief.12 It is submitted that the plaintiff,
as insurer of a tortfeasor, is entitled to the same treatment."3
In at least twelve jurisdictions in this country, the harshness of the rule denying
contribution as between tortfeasors and the inability and unwillingness of the courts
to break away from it by decision has been met by lehislation. 14 Most of these
8. Reath, supra note 4, at 178.
9. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R., 196 U. S. 217 (Ig05);
Forsythe v. Los Angeles Ry., 149 Cal. 569, 87 Pac. 24 (1906); Larkin Co. v. Terminal
Warehouse Co., 161 App. Div. 262, 146 N. Y. Supp. 380 (Ist Dep't 1914), aff'd, 221
N. Y. 707, 117 N. E. 1074 (1917); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio 582, 173
N. E. 194 (1930); Cain v. Quannah Light & Ice Co., 131 OIa. 25, 267 Pac. 641 (1928).
But see Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co., Ltd., (1894) A. C. 318,
322, where the court sharply criticized the application of the non-contribution rule as
between unintentional tortfeasors.
10. Underwriters at Lloyds of M inneapolis v. Smith, 166 Ilinn. 388, 203 N. W. 13
(1926); Furbeck v. I. Gevurtz & Son, 72 Ore. 12, 143 Pac. 654 (1914); Goldman v.
Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 At. 231 (1928); Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis.
591, 195 N. W. 855 (1923); Palmer v. Wick & Pulteneytown Steam Shipping Co., Ltd.,
(1894) A. C. 318.
11. It has also been argued that contribution would be an agency for social control.
At present, the denial of contribution as between tortfeasors is responsible for the fre-
quency of fraud by one tortfeasor in inducing the injured party to sue the other tort-
feasors. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortlfeasors (1932) 81 U. or Pa.
L. REv. 130, 137, n. 35.
12. Kolb v. National Surety Co., 176 N. Y. 233, 68 N. E. 247 (1903); White Plains v.
Ellis, 113 Mlisc. 5, 184 N. Y. Supp. 444 (Sup. Ct. 1920). But cf. Boyer v. Bolender, 129
Pa. St. 324, 18 AUt. 127 (1889).
13. As to whether an insurer should be given greater rights than its insured, see
(1931) 79 U. or PA. L. Rxv. 507.
14. GA. CODE AaN-N. (Michie, 1926) § 4512-13 (applies only between joint trespassers);
KANS. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 60-3737 (applies only between joint judgment debtors);
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statutes are defective, however, in that they allow contribution only when a joint
judgment has been obtained against the tortfeasors and satisfied by one.16 A recent
English statute' 6 has met this problem with admirable clarity and directness. Its
sweeping provisions allow contribution between all tortfeasors, whether or not the
wrong was intentional, and without requiring any joint judgment to be rendered
against them. In effect, it permits the courts to adjudicate the liability of the
tortfeasors according to the responsibility of each for the tort.17  This statute
would seem to mark a distinct advance toward bringing about justice in the appor-
tionment of damages between tortfeasors. The docild manner with which the
majority of our courts have accepted the rule denying contribution as between
tortfeasors would appear to necessitate similar legislative action.
TORTS-WILLS--INTERFERENCE WITH TESTAMENTARY DIsPoSITION.--The decedent,
intending to leave her property to the plaintiff, signed a document purporting to be
her will. The defendant, the decedent's husband, who would have received all the
property had his wife died intestate, prevented the publication and attestation of the
will by force and intimidation. The plaintiff instituted an action sounding in tort
predicated upon these acts. On appeal from a judgment dismissing the petition,
held, that since an incomplete bequest does not create a legal right in the intended
legatee, the acts of the defendant which defeated the bequest breached no duty
and hence .gave rise to no liability in tort. Judgment affirmed. Cunninghain v.
Edward, 3 N. E. (2d) 58 (Ohio Ct. of App. 1936).
The instant decision is founded upon the principle that an action which does not
amount to a legal injury is not actionable merely because it is done with evil intent. 1
It is well settled that while a child is usually expected to share its parents' estate,
Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 484a; MD. CODE PuB. LAWS (Flack, 1935) art. 50, § 12a;
Micr. CoMp. LAws (1929) § 14497 (applies only to libel cases); Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) §
3268; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 76-101; N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. ACT (1928) § 211a;
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 618; TEx. ANrN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 2212;
VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5779; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 13. Also see Legis.
(1932) 45 HAv. L. REv. 369.
15. The statutes referred to are as follows: MD. CODE Pu. LAWs (Flack, 1935) art.
50, § 12a; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 3268; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) § 76-
101; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1928) § 211a; TEx. ANN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 2212;
W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 13.
16. English Joint Tortfeasors Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Gao. V., c. 30, §§ 6, 7, 8.
17. Most American statutes allocate the damages between the tortfeasors by an equal
division between them. MD. CODE PuB. LAws (Flack, 1935) art. 50, § 12a; Mo. REv.
STAT. (1929) § 3268; MicH. ComP. LAws (1929) § 14497; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Court-
right, 1929) § 76-101; N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1928) § 211a; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1935) § 618; Tax. ANN. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 2212; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930)
§ 5779; W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 7, § 13. Compare the comparative negligence
doctrine which is applied in admiralty. The Max Morris, 137 U. S. 1 (1890).
1. Passaic Print Works v. Ely and Walker Dry Goods Co., 105 Fed. 163 (C. C. A.
8th, 1900); Metzger v. Hochrein, 107 Wis. 267, 83 N. W. 308 (1900). See Stevenson v.
Newnham, 13 C. B. 285, 297, 138 Eng. Reprints 1208, 1213 (1853). An act evilly in-
tended may impugn a moral right, but not a legal right, as there is no necessary Iden-
tity or relation between them. ". . . a legal right must be established on principles of general
utility to which the state gives its sanction." 1 BL. Comm2x. *123 n.
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the law does not insure this as a right.2 By the same token, the court in the principal
case adjudged the plaintiff to have merely a naked interest not recognized in law.
This view, in the face of the unconscionable conduct of the defendant, shows strict
adherence to the principle. The instant court declared that this action was novel,
with no precedent available as authority.
It might have been argued that the court should have allowed recovery on the
strength of adjudications in analogous situations. In the field of business contracts,
interference has been considered actionable. For instance, where abandonment of
employment by workmen was procured by the inducements of a third party, the
employer recovered.3 Likewise a fraudulent discharge of an employee secured by a
third party has been the basis of an action. 4  Where a parol contract for the
sale of merchandise failed because a fraudulent third party intervened and bought the
goods, the prospective buyer was given redress.5 Some courts have indicated that
a wrongful intermeddling with the formation of commercial or employment contracts
-was no less actionable than an interference with existing contracts.0 In the treat-
ment of cases involving gifts which are more closely allied with the case at bar,
there is a dearth of authority on the question of whether or not a tort action is
proper where there is interference with an intended gift. However, one jurisdiction
has pointed to the advisability of such relief where a reasonable expectancy was
disturbed or fraudulently prevented from fruition.7 As regards interference with
testamentary dispositions, an action in tort was sustained where a will was fraudu-
lently suppressed and a false one probated.8 But where a prospective testamentary
gift has been interfered with, authorities do not allow an action by the prospective
devisee. 9 In the case at bar, the purely prospective nature of the claim, as con-
trasted with the objective and concrete reality of the contract rights present in most
of the analogous cases, clearly justifies the decision. In view of the possibility that
2. Reid v. Armistead, 228 Ala. .75, 151 So. 874 (1933) (testator may dispose of estate
with such limitations as are lawful); Rice v. Andrews, 127 Misc. 826, 217 N. Y. Supp.
528 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (father may disinherit at will); Auld v. Cathro, 20 N. D. 416, 128
N. W. 1025 (1910) (children have no legal right to assert against a duly executed will).
3. Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555 (1871); Delz v. Winfree, 80 Tex. 400, 16 S. W.
111 (1891) (a cause of action against one who induced another not to deal with the
plaintiff). Cf. London Guarantee v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526 (1903).
4. Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125 (1901). Ci. National Protective
Ass'n v. Cuming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902) (coercing persons to abstain from
business relations).
5. Angle v. Chicago, S. P., M. & 0. Ry., 151 U. S. I (1893); Rice v. Manley, 66 N.
Y. 82 (1876). Cf. Van Horn v. Van Horn, 52 N. J. L. 284, 20 Atl. 485 (1890) (los of
consignment and trade through fraud of third party).
6. See Carnes v. St. Paul Union Stockyards, 164 Minn. 457, 459, 20S N. W. 630, 631
(1925); Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N. J. L. 729, 743-744, 65 At. 165, 171 (1906).
2 CooL'y, TORTs (3d ed. 1906) § 328.
7. See Mitchell v. Langley, 143 Ga. 827, 835, 85 S. E. 1050, 1053 (1915) (beneficiary
of insurance certificate). Contra, Ross v. Wright, 286 Mass. 269, 190 N. E. 514 (1934)
(act of preventing gift was not unlawful).
8. Morton v. Petitt, 124 Ohio 241, 177 N. E. 591 (1931) (It should be noted, however,
that in the instant case, the instrument never achieved the status of a vill).
9. Only a few dicta indicate that a prospective beneficiary has such a status as will
allow him to bring an action against an intermeddler. See Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Ma-s.
520, 526, 81 N. E. 248, 250 (1907) (deprivation of legacy by fraud ... such fraudulent
conduct ... a wrong on plaintiff as well as testatrix").
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a donor or testator may change his mind,' 0 and the commonly recognized fact
that people often fail to carry out expressed intentions, it is submitted that the
court properly denied liability in tort.
As equity has from its inception relieved many who were denied an adequate remedy
at law, perhaps relief might be afforded in this situation by impressing a constructive
trust on the property. When property is acquired under such circumstances that
the holder of the legal title should not in good conscience retain the beneficial inter-
est, equity converts him into a trustee for the benefit of the party morally entitled to
the enjoyment of the property." Equity will not only interfere to set aside acts
done by fraud, but when performance of an act is prevented by fraud it will treat the
case as if the act has been completed. 12 Actual fraud, however, need not be present
in order that a constructive trust be impressed on property.18 It would seem that
these principles might well be applied where as in the instant case duress is the moving
agent.14
UNFAIR COMPETITION-TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF TRADE NAME-FRAUDULENT
DECEPTION OF PUBLIC.-Since 1872, the plaintiff, a French corporation, owned and
operated two Paris restaurants specializing in sea food, which it conducted under
the family name of "Prunier". A discriminating clientele, largely international in
character, soon was patronizing these eating places, and a branch was opened in
London early in 1935. A New York restaurant of similar quality and origin was
contemplated, although such plans had not as yet passed beyond the formative stage.
In July, 1935, an establishment known as "Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe" was opened
in New York by the individual defendants, having neither connection with, nor the
sanction of, the original Prunier of Paris, although it was extensively advertised as
"The Famous French Sea-food Restaurant." Suit was brought to enjoin the defend-
ants from representing themselves to be in any way connected with the original
Prunier. On motion for a temporary injunction the defendants freely admitted
appropriation of the name because of the international good-will which had accrued
thereto, but contended that the plaintiff was entitled to no protection beyond the
territory in which it operated. Held, temporary injunction granted, pending the
10. In a case where a testatrix had destroyed a will and stated that she intended to
go the "first fine day" to have another drawn, and mentioned the provisions intended to
be included therein, the court said: "This was merely an expression of an unwritten
intention to do something in the future, and, no matter how fully her mind was then made
up, there might be a change of intention at any time before it was permanently expressed
in writing .... ." In re Emernecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369, 372, 67 Atl. 701, 702 (1907).
11. Moore v. Crump, 84 Miss. 612, 30 So. 109 (1904) (land procured through fraud);
Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378 (1919) (profits
held against employer). 3 POME-oY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1048.
12. Middleton v. Middleton, 1 Jac. & W. 94, 37 Eng. Reprints 311 (Ch. 1819) Cf.
Church v. Ruland, 64 Pa. 432 (1870). I STORY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENCE (13th ed. 1886)
§ 187.
13. One who acquires property through theft has been held to be a constructive
trustee. Clifford Banking Co. v. Donovan Co., 195 Mo. 262, 94 S. W. 527 (1906);
likewise, one who obtains property by murdering the testator. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.
Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
14. Luttrell v. Olmius, cited in Mestaer v. Gillespie, 11 Ves. 622, 638, Eng. Reprints
1230, 1236 (Ch. 1805). Cf. 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed. 1929) § 192 (where.




outcome of trial. Maison Pruier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc.
551, 288 N. Y. Supp. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
The law of unfair competition has, fortunately, been progressively relaxed from
the strictures of the early decision of Blanchard v. Hill,' where the use of an
injunction against an infringement of a registered trade mark was refused. Today
the plastic remedies of the chancery are almost universally conformed to ethical
business practice.2 No longer need the court insist as a condition precedent to
injunctive action that the goods be alike,3 or offered in the same market to the
same purchasers. 4 The base of the relief has been broadened to include all instances
1. 2 Atk. 484, 26 Eng. Reprints 692 (Ch. 1742). Lord Hardwicke voiced his apprehension
of the "mischievous consequence" which would result if he held otherwise. True, a legal
remedy was available (see case cited in Southern v. How, Poph. 143, 144, 79 Eng.
Reprints 1243, 1244 [K.B. 1618]), but it was inadequate for the plaintiff's needs, as was
recognized by subsequent decisions. Lord Eldon, in granting the injunction in Hogg v.
Kirby, 8 Ves. 215, 32 Eng. Reprints 336 (Ch. 1803), was more mindful of the commercial
need for equitable relief in such a situation. Millington v. Fox, 3 Myl. & Cr. 338, 40 Eng.
Reprints 956 (Ch. 1838) first granted the injunction without an affirmative shoing of
fraud on the part of the defendant. For a discusion of the early authorities in the first
adjudication on this subject in this country, see Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Spear, 2 Sandf. 599,
606 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1849). See also NIrs, UNFAm Cosrzirrxon (3d ed. 1929) § 7
et seq.; Comment (1913) 26 HAnv. L. REy. 442.
2. Principles formerly regarded as firmly grounded in the law of unfair competition
have in many instances been displaced in whole or in part as a result of an increasing
refusal by the courts to bend their ears sympathetically toward the implausible pleas of
justification offered by dishonorable traders. See, generally, Schechter, The Rational Basis
of Trade-Mark Protection (1927) 40 HEnv. L. RaE. 813; Id, Fog and Fiction in Trade-
Mark Protection (1936) 36 COL. L. R.v. 60; Handler and Pickett, Trade-Mar:s and Trade
Names-An Analysis and a Synthesis (1930) 30 COL. L. Ray. 168, 759. The courts
readily recognize the broadening scope of the protection afforded. See Ralston Purina Co.
v. Saniwax Paper Co., 26 F. (2d) 941, 943 (W. D. Mich. 1928).
3. The senior appropriator's right to an injunction does not turn upon the question
as to whether the competing goods are of the same character or quality. Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America,
Inc., 4 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928); Long's Hat Stores v. Long's Clothes, 224 App. Div. 497, 231 N. Y.
Supp. 107 (1st Dep't 1928); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679,
264 N. Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1932), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. Supp. 821
(1st Dep't 1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933). The "heart of the matter" is
the hold of the trade mark or trade name upon the public mind. This value may be
diminished by a whittling away of the uniqueness of the symbol or name, as a result of
use on another's goods, even though the goods be non-competing. This viev; was first
advanced by Schecter, supra note 2, at 831-832. It was later incorporated in the law
of New York. Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., supra. But many authorities
have insisted upon a much closer relationship between the conflicting products before relief
was granted. Carney Hospital v. McDonald, 227 Mass. 231, 116 N. E. 414 (1917); Regent
Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Haaker, 75 Neb. 426, 106 N. W. 595 (1906); Corning Glass Works v.
Corning Cut Glass Co., 197 N. Y. 173, 90 N. E. 449 (1910) ; Aerators, Ltd. v. Tollitt, [1902]
2 Ch. 319, 19 Rep. Pat. Cas. 418.
4. The fact that one person sells directly to the retail trade, and the other to the jobbers
and distributors, will not operate as a defense of the infringement. Phillips v. Governor
& Co., Inc., 79 F. (2d) 971 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935). A corporate name will be scrupulously
protected against another adopting the same name, though the lines of endeavor be entirely
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where one offers his wares to the public as those of another.6 The more recent
decisions under this theory are inclined to grant relief to the senior appropriator
where dissimilar products are offered under conflicting trade marks or trade names0
in the same geographical market,7 and deny him relief where the markets are not
coincident, notwithstanding the conflicting goods are of a related or identical char-
acter.8 However, in this situation relief has been afforded in the junior appro-
priator's market when the senior has satisfactorily demonstrated the probability of
his one day annexing the disputed market through the processes of natural trade
expansion.0 That the widespread reputation of the plaintiff's wares, as built up by
a large scale program of advertising or otherwise, is endangered by the infringement, 10
or that the junior acted on a mere license from the senior, revocable at will, 11
has also negated the effect of noncoincident trading-places. Evidence to the effect
that some sales have been made by the senior in the disputed market may also serve
to remove the case from this rule,' 2 and there have been suggestions that a fraudulent
intent on the part of the junior to deceive purchasers will deprive him of his
immunity.' 3 It is the last exception from the general rule denying relief upon
dissimilar. Colo. Nat. v. Colorado Nat. Bank, 95 Colo. 386, 36 P. (2d) 454 (1934);
Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v. Churchill Downs, Inc., 262 Ky. 567, 90 S. W. (2d)
1041 (1936).
5. See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 380 (1926). "There Is no
fetish in the word 'competition'. The invocation of equity rests more vitally upon the
unfairness." Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 512 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924).
"It is confusion of origin, not confusion of goods, which controls." Vicks Chemical Co. v.
Vick Medicine Co., 8 F. (2d) 49, 52 (D. Ga. 1925).
6. Generally speaking, a trade mark is applicable to the vendible commodity to which
it is affixed, and a trade name to the business or good-will. See American Steel Foundries
v. Robertson, 269 U. S. 372, 380 (1926). A trade mark is protected along the same lines
as a trade name, the modern tendency being not to differentiate with nicety between the
two. See Handler and Pickett, supra note 2, at 759; Comment (1913) 26 HAav. L. Rsv.
442, 445.
7. Armour & Co. v. Master Tire & Rubber Co., 34 F. (2d) 201 (S. D. Ohio 1925); Wis-
consin Elec. Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929); Finchley, Inc. v. Finch-
ly Co., 40 F. (2d) 736 (D. Md. 1929).
8. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1916); United Drug Co. v. The-
odore Rectanus, 248 U. S. 90 (1918); Nisley Shoe Co. v. Nisley, 72 F. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. 6th,
1934); Loew's Boston Theatres Co. v. Lowe, 248 Mass. 456, 143 N. E. 496 (1924),
36 A. L. R. 922 (1925).
9. Western Oil Refining Co. v. Jones, 27 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); Stewart's
Sandwiches, Inc. v. Seward's Cafeteria, Inc., 60 F. (2d) 981 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
10. Buckspan v. Hudson's Bay Co., 22 F. (2d) 721 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927). "The place of
the reputation is the protected territory wherever the trade is." See Hiram Walker & Sons v.
Penn-Maryland Corp., 79 F. (2d) 836, 839 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935). The above quotation
is particularly applicable to the facts of the instant case.
11. Vermont Maple Sugar Co. v. Johnson, 272 Fed. 478 (D. Vt. 1921); Coles Proprietary,
Ltd. v. Need, [1934] A. C. 82, 50 Rep. Pat. Cas. 379.
12. Kathreiner Malzkaffee Fab. v. Pastor Kneipp Med. Co., 82 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 7th,
1897); Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F. (2d) 920 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
13. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 415 (1916); United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90, 100 (1918); see also General Baking Co. v. Gor-
man, 295 Fed. 168, 172 (D. R. I. 1924), aff'd, 3 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925), ccrt. denied,
268 U. S. 705 (1925). No adjudication has been discovered squarely in support of, or
derived from, the above-mentioned dicta, but the emphasis placed therein on the good
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which the court in the principle case found its position.14 The exception seems a
valid one for the most part, and certainly there can be no moral or ethical objection
to the result reached.15 But, as one distinguished writer has pointed out,10 results
such as this have been attained more by appeals to judicial conscience than by
strict contemplation of the legal principles involved. Nor is the instant case free
from traces of illogicality when its substance is rationalized. It contends that
equity should stay its hand while it probes the miscreant's mental promptings; being
satisfied of his perfidy, then it may enjoin his further acts. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the injury to the complainant in all cases of unfair competition is
attributable not to the junior's fraudulent intent, but to the deception of the pur-
chasing public resulting from the false badge wom by defendant's goods.17 That
the latter contemplated injury to no one should be immaterial, as is the rule where
the markets are coincident,18 except in so far as the question of damages is
concerned.' 9 It would be consistent with the modem expansion of this branch of
the law were injunctive relief grounded solely upon a material deception of the
public with the resultant injury to the plaintiff's business, irrespective of any con-
sideration of the infringer's intent.
WILLS-ORDER or SIGNING---EFFECT OF VITNESSES SIGNING PRIOR TO TESTATOL-
The propounded will was prepared by a local justice of the peace and taken to
the home of two neighbors by the testator who thereupon read it to them and
requested them to sign as witnesses. They complied and returned the document
to the testator who immediately subscribed his name in their presence. On the
.probate proceeding, the grandchildren of the testator contested the validity of the
faith of the junior lends them impressive weight. It has been held that a patently wrongful
attempt to forestall the extension of another's trade or to benefit from his reputation vil
deny the offender any immunity, unless the competing goods be in no wise of a related
character. Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
14. This decision also illustrates the modem tendency not to distinguih unnecessarily in
the handling of trade mark and trade name cases (Handler and Pickett, supra note 2,
at 759). The court rests its decision upon the broad principles of unfair competition, al-
though its authorities (supra note 13) were concerned solely with a subdivision thereof, the
law of trade marks. However, unfair competition differs in no fundamental from trade
mark law. Glenn, Pre-emption in Connection wil; Unfair Trade (1919) 19 COL. L. Rnv.
29, 34 et seq.
15. However, a functional approach to the problem might find that the result smacks
suspiciously of commercial inequality and exploitation. See Cohen, Transcendental Non-
sense and the Functional Approach (1935) 35 COL. L. Rnv. 809, 814-817. Cf. Schecter,
supra note 2, at 66 n. 14, 86-87.
16. Schecter, supra note 2, at 831 et seq.
17. "The controlling question in all cases where the equitable power of the courts is
invoked is, whether the acts complained of are fair or unfair." Fisher v. Star Co., 231 N. Y.
414, 427, 132 N. E. 133, 137 (1921).
18. American Products Co. v. American Products Co., 42 F. (2d) 483 (S. D. Mich.
1930); Deister Concentrator Co. v. Deister Mfach. Co., 63 Ind. App. 412, 112 N. E. 906
(1916); Taendsticksfabriks Akticbolagot Vulcan v. Meyers, 139 N. Y. 364, 34 N. E. 904
(1893); Millington v. Fox, 3 MlyL & Cr. 338, 40 Eng. Reprints 956 (Ch. 1838), cited
supra note 1.
19. The innocence of the wrongdoer is generally held material on the question of
damages, and generally serves to absolve him from pecuniary liability. Liberty Oil Corp. v.
Crowley, Miner & Co. 270 Mch. 187, 258 N. W. 241, 96 A. L. R. 651 (1935).
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instrument on the sole ground that the execution of the will was improper due to
the fact that the attesting witnesses signed prior to the testator. Held, the signing
by the witnesses and the testator constituted one transaction and the will was
properly executed. In re Jones' Estate, 157 Misc. 847, 285 N. Y. Supp. 894 (Surr.
Ct. 1936).
The procedure for the execution of a will is statutory.' While it may be stated
that the tendency of the New York courts is to place a less rigid construction on
the statutes than they did some years ago,2 it is equally true that substantial
compliance with the statute is essential to proper execution.3
The New York Court of Appeals has definitely decided that the execution of a
will is fatally defective where the witnesses sign before the testator,4 although the
New York statute does not expressly prescribe the order of signing.5 Many juris-
dictions have held that where the execution of a will and the witnessing thereof
are effected at one transaction, the order of signing is immaterial.0 This has been
denominated the "rule of contemporaneity ' 7 and has been applied in New York
in a cases where there had been substantial compliance with the statute and where
1. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW (1909) § 21; GA. CODE (1933) c. 113, § 301; ILL. REv. STAT.
ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c. 148, § 2; MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op., 1933) c. 191,
§ 1; CAL. PROB. CODE (Deering, 1935) § 50.
2. Matter of O'Neil, 91 N. Y. 516 (1883); Matter of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455, 26 N, E.
1028 (1891); Matter of Andrews, 162 N. Y. 1, 59 N. E. 529 (1900); Matter of Field,
204 N. Y. 448, 107 N. E. 881 (1912). (These cases are all concerned with an interpreta-
tion of the requirement that a will must be signed at the end. The last case cited greatly
relaxes the interplretation of the Court of Appeals in the earlier cases). Lewis v. Lewis,
11 N. Y. 220 (1854) ; Gilbert v. Knox, 52 N. Y. 125 (1873) ; Matter of Beckett, 103 N. Y.
167, 8 N. E. 506 (1886); Matter of Crill, 214 App. Div. 849, 211 N. Y. Supp. 908 (4th
Dep't 1925), aff'g, 124 Misc. 134, 207 N. Y. Supp. 775 (Surr. Ct. 1924). (These cases are
all concerned with an interpretation of publication. The later cases relax the rule, estab-
lished in the first two cases cited, that an express declaration by the testator that the In-
strument is his will is essential to publication). Matter of Fowles, 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N.
E. 611 (1918), relaxes the rule established in Matter of Pifford, 111 N. Y. 410, 18 N. E.
718 (1888), and Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, 126 N. Y. 215, 28 N. E. 238 (1891)
against the incorporation of extrinsic documents of a testamentary nature that have not
been authenticated as required by the statute. See Matter of Booth, 127 N. Y. 109, 116,
27 N. E. 826, 827 (1891) wherein the Court of Appeals said, "it is wiser to construe these
statutes closely, rather than loosely and so open a door for the perpetration of the
mischief which the statutes were designed to prevent." But see Matter of Fowles, sispra,
where Judge Cardozo, writing for the Court, said at p. 233, "We must consider the
reason of the rule, and the evils which it aims to remedy. But as soon as we apply that
test, the problem solves itself."
3. Hogradt v. Kingman, 22 N. Y. 372 (1860); Butler v. Sherwood, 233 N. Y. 655, 135
N. E. 957 (1922), aff'g, 196 App. Div. 603, 188 N. Y. Supp. 242 (3rd Dep't 1921), afl'g,
114 Misc. 483, 186 N. Y. Supp. 712 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
4. Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153 (1868); Sisters of Charity v. Kelley, 67 N. Y. 4Q9
(1876).
5. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW (1909) § 21.
6. In re Silva, 169 Cal. 116, 145 Pac. 1015 (1915); O'Brien v. Gallagher, 25 Conn. 229
(1856); Gibson v. Nelson, 181 Ill. 126, 54 N. E. 901 (1899); In re Horn's Estate, 161
Mich. 20, 125 N. W. 696 (1910); Gordon v. Parker, 139 Miss. 334, 104 So. 77 (1925).
7. 1 JEssUP-REDiELD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATE'S COURTS (8th ed. 1930)
514.
8. Matter of Solomon Haber, 118 Misc. 179, 192 N. Y. Supp. 616 (Surr. Ct. 1922).
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denial of the validity of the will would have exposed to possible substantial im-
pairment, the estate of a devoted and faithful wife who had been instrumental in
building up her husband's fortune. Undoubtedly justice was dispensed by the applica-
tion of the rule in this instance, but the reasoning of the court seems strained0 and it
is difficult to reconcile the holding with the conclusions of the earlier cases.10
Although many states apply the "rule of contemporaneity", the soundness of
the reasoning of their courts is not questioned since it is not the settled law of
these jurisdictions that the testator must sign prior to the witness for the will to
be validly executed."' Even in these states, however, if a witness signs prior to
the testator and at a separate transaction it is not disputed that a will executed
in such a manner is invalid.'
2
9. Testator declared the propounded document to be his last will and testament and
asked two persons, one of whom was the husband of one of the contestants, to act as
witnesses. They thereupon subscribed their names. The testator in the presence of the
witnesses, then read the will aloud, including in his reading, the names of the witnesses.
He then spoke to one of the witnesses, about its contents, referring to the instrument as
his will and signed it in the presence of the witnesses. The surrogate held that such
action was equivalent to a new request to the witnesses that they act as such and cited
Vaughn v. Burford, 3 Bradf. 78 (1854). The court strained its logic to conclude that
the witnesses tacitly adopted their signatures and affirmed their acts of witne.sing the
will, citing Matter of Baldwin, 142 App. Div. 904, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1121 (2d Dep't 1910),
aff'g, 67 Misc. 329, 124 N. Y. Supp. 612 (Surr. Ct. 1910) wherein the court held that there is
only a difference of probative degree in a tacit and positive ratification of signature. It is
to be noted that Matter of Haber, supra, is clearly distinguishable from the case at bar
in that there the testator republished his will after signing it and impliedly requested the
witnesses to witness the instrument as his will a second time, which they did by adopting
their signatures. In the instant case the testator merely signed the will and pocketed it.
There is no additional fact to distinguish it from Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153 (1868).
10. Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153 (1868); In re Mackay, 110 N. Y. 611, 18 N. E.
433 (1888); Matter of Bernsee, 141 N. Y. 389, 36 N. E. 314 (1894); Matter of Kunkler,
147 N. Y. Supp. 1094 (Surr. Ct. 1914). In Jackson v. Jackson, supra, the court obviously
anticipated the problem which would arise where the signing by the witnesses and the
testator would constitute a single transaction and said, at p. 162, "I was first inclined to
think that if the whole was done at the same interview, the attestation by the signing
of the witnesses might be done in any part of it without regard to the order of events;
... but, upon further reflection, I am satisfied that the view taken of the subject by the
ecclesiastical court in England, best conforms to the language and intent of the statute.
[The view taken by the English court is that the testator must sign first. Goods of Olding,
2 Cur. Ecc. 8651 ... The attestation by witnesses is of a past transaction, it is so in its
nature, and so in the ordering, and, I think, the meaning of the statute."
11. This is undoubtedly the majority ruling, In re Silva, 169 Cal. 116, 145 Pac. 1015
(1915); O'Brien v. Gallagher, 25 Conn. 229 (1856); Gibson v. Nelson, 181 Ill. 126, 54 N. E.
901 (1899); In re Horn's Estate, 161 Mich. 20, 125 N. W. 696 (1910); Gordon v. Parker,
139 Miss. 334, 104 So. 77 (1925) (this case admits the force in the argument that one
cannot attest to nothing, but concludes that the better reasoning is the other way). The
minolrity view has considerable following, however, Lane v. Lane, 125 Ga. 386, 54 S. E.
90 (1906); Barnes v. Chase, 208 Mass. 409, 94 N. E. 694 (1911); Tobin v. Haack, 79
Mfinn. 107, 81 N. W. 758 (1900); Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153 (1868); Pennant v.
Kingscote, 3 Cort. 642, 163 Eng. Reprints 853 (Prerog. 1843).
12. Reed v. Watson, 27 Ind. 443 (1867); Limbach v. Bolin 169 Ky. 204, 183 S. W.
495 (1916); Schermerhorn v. Meritt, 123 Mich. 310, 82 N. W. 513 (1900); In re Irvine's
Estate, 206 Pa. 1, 55 AtL 79S (1903).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
It is the purpose of these statutes 13 to prevent fraud and imposition 14 and to
this end insure the presence at the time of the act of execution of persons of the
testator's selection who can testify as to his mental condition'r and attest to and
identify the signature of the testator. 16 It is difficult to perceive wherein the purpose
of the statute could be frustrated under the factual presentation of the principal
case. To adopt the words of the Michigan court, 17 ". . . where there is no explicit
requirement of the statute as to the order of the signatures and when all who
participate are present at the same time and their acts are part of one continuous
transaction, it requires no extended argument to determine that the order of such
signing is immaterial under such a statute." The "rule of contemporaneity" fur-
nishes a satisfactory solution of the problem, but it is submitted that in New York
its application to a statement of facts identical with the principal case is incompatible
with the law as expressed by the Court of Appeals in the matter of Jackson v.
Jackson' s unless that decision be specifically limited to its facts.
WRONGFUL DEATH-BASIS OF ACTION-LIABILITY OF TELEPHONE CO. FOR FAILURE
OF SERvIE.-The plaintiff attempted to summon a physician by telephone to attend
his daughter who was seriously ill. Failing upon repeated and prolonged efforts to
obtain a response from the operator, he was eventually compelled to dispatch a
messenger. When, after considerable delay, the doctor was finally reached, the
child was beyond aid. This action was brought under the appropriate statute1 for
the wrongful death of the child, the negligent failure of the telephone company to
perform its duty of service2 being alleged as the cause thereof. Defendant set
forth as a second affirmative defense that its liability was limited to pro rata allow-
ances on the amount of monthly charges paid. From an order granting a motion
to strike out this defense, on appeal, held, three judges dissenting, the complaint
was insufficient in law since it did not appear that the decedent would have had
a cause of action had she survived.3  Judgment reversed. Emery v. Rochester
Tel. Corp., 271 N. Y. 306, 3 N. E. (2d) 434 (1936).
Aside from the issue of pleading--the basis on which it was ultimately decided 4
13. See note 1, supra.
14. See In re Booth, 127 N. Y. 109, 116, 27 N. E. 826, 827 (1891); Jackson v. Jack-
son, 39 N. Y. 153, 160 (1868).
15. See Matter of Moyer, 97 Misc. 512, 163 N. Y. Supp. 296 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
16. See In re Kunkler's Will, 147 N. Y. Supp. 1094, 1095 (Surr. Ct. 1914).
17. See Horn's Estate v. Bartow, 161 Mich. 20, 28, 125 N. W. 696, 699 (1910).
18. 39 N. Y. 153 (1868).
1. N. Y. DEC. EST. LAW (1920) § 130, which provides in pa)rt: "The executor or ad-
ministrator . . .of a decedent who has left him or her surviving a husband, wife, or next
of kin, may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or default,
by which the decedent's death was caused against a natural person who, or a corporation
which, would have been liable to an action in favor of the decedent by reason thereof If
death had not ensued."
2. N. Y. PUn. SEavcE LAW (1910) § 91, providing in part that " ...every telephone
:orporation shall furnish and provide with respect to its business such instrumentalities
and facilities as shall be adequate and in all respects just and reasonable."
3. In order to recover in an action under N. Y. DEC. EsT. LAw (1920) § 130, see note
1, supra, it is expressly required to be shown that the decedent could have brought an
action for such wrongful act, had he survived.
4. Some dissatisfaction has been expressed with the stringent interpretation placed upon
the statute by the court in the instant case. N. Y. L. J., Aug. 25, 1936, p. 504, col. 1.
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-the instant case, both on its facts and because of its treatment by the court,
raises the interesting question of whether the telephone company has any liability
under the circumstances set forth.5 The further question of whether that liability,
if it exists, may be validly limited,6 the question on appeal not discussed by the
court, 7 does not achieve significance until the controlling question of liability itself
is answered.
An examination of the authorities reveals a paucity of litigation on the instant
facts. The few decisions on the point resolve themselves, generally, into two
classes: Those which submitted the question to the jury and allowed a recovery
upon a finding that the damage would have been averted had the company properly
performed its duty to render service; 8 and, secondly, those which denied the allegation
of proximate cause as a matter of law, deeming it too conjectural to be entrusted
to the jury.9 The theory underlying the decisions of the first group is well exem-
plified by Glawson v. Southern Bell Tel. atd Tel. Co. 10 The facts in that case were
similar to those in the principal case. The company's failure to render service was
alleged to be the proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's wife, she having
Though the court here did not indicate clearly what specific form of allegation was re-
quired, it would appear that it is necessary to set forth the conjectural facts which would
have constituted decedent's cause of action had he survived. Such detailed allegation in an
action of this sort had not previously been thought required. Brown v. Buffalo & S. L. R.
R., 22 N. Y. 191 (1860).
5. The tort liability, if any, would be founded upon the duty owed to the public by
the company, as a public service corporation.
6. It was contended by the defendant that its liability was limited by the terms of its
rate schedule, as filed with the public service commission, to pro rata allowances on charges
paid. The validity of this defense was denied by the trial court, holding such a limitation
void, as against public policy. Emery v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 156 Misc. 562, 282 N.
Y. Supp. 280 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 787, 286 N. Y. Supp. 439 (4th
Dep't 1935). Certain it is, at least, that no stipulation avoiding liability for gross negli-
gence would be allowable, though one for negligence might be. Kiley v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 109 N. Y. 231, 16 N. E. 75 (1888); Weld v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 199
N. Y. 88, 92 N. E. 415 (1910); Krivitsky v. Western Union Tel. Co., 129 Misc. 431, 221 N.
Y. Supp. 525 (Mun. Ct. 1927); cf. Straus v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 254 N. Y. 407, 173 N. E.
564 (1930). But see REsATEarNrT, CoN'ncrs (1932) § 575 (1-b) which without apparent
qualification terms the contract illegal if "the bargain relates to negligence in perform-
ance of its duty to the public ... "' (Italic supplied).
7. In New York an attack upon an affirmative defense enables the defendant, on appeal,
to question the sufficiency of the complaint, and if the latter be bad, the defemse may be
deemed a good answer to the insufficient complaint, no further inquiry into the defense being
-equired. Baxter v. McDonnell, 154 N. Y. 432, 48 N .E. 816 (1897); Small v. Sullivan, 245
N. Y. 343, 157 N. E. 261 (1927).
8. Sommerville v. Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co., 258 Fed. 147 (App. D. C. 1919); Vinon
v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 188 Ala. 292, 66 So. 100 (1914); Harbaugh v. Citizens
Tel. Co., 190 Mich. 421, 157 N. W. 32 (1916); Peterson v. Monroe Ind. Tel. Co, 106 Neb.
181, 182 N. W. 1017 (1921); Chesapeake & Pot. Tel. Co. v. Carless, 127 Va. 5, 102 S. E.
569 (1920), 23 A. L. R. 952 (1923).
9. Volquardsen v. Iowa Tel. Co., 148 Iowa 77, 126 N. W. 928 (1910); Providence Wash.
Ins. Co. v. Iowa Tel. Co., 172 Iowa 597, 154 N. W. 874 (1915); Lebanon, L. & L. Tel. Co.
v. Lanham, 131 Ky. 718, 115 S. W. 824 (1909); Cody v. New York Tel. Co., 3 N. J.
Misc. 1176, 131 At. 221 (C. P. 1925); see Lawson v. Haskell Tel. Co., 224 S. IV. 390, 391
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
10. 9 Ga. App. 450, 71 S. E. 747 (1911).
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died of a hemorrhage after a premature birth in which she was unattended by her
physician due to plaintiff's inability to reach him by telephone. The court there
held that since the nature of the malady was such that in all reasonable probability
prompt medical assistance could have effected a cure-indeed, could probably have
avoided the hemorrhage entirely-the question was purely one of fact to be
submitted to the jury upon the testimony of the physician involved and other
experts. The case itself is of doubtful validity because the highest court of Georgia
held in a similar situation that an earlier case holding contra the Glawson case,' 1
was the law. 12  Nevertheless whatever may be the authoritative status of the
Glafson case its rationale commends itself as a logical exposition of one possible
solution to the problem.
On the other hand those courts which refused to submit the question to the jury
argued that it was unwarranted to assume that, even had the call been properly
transmitted, the damage would have been averted. It was clothing conjecture with
the validity of fact, they maintained, to assert that all the other factors which might
possibly have affected the transaction would necessarily have cooperated toward its
successful termination. Under this view, failure to put through a call for the
fire department,' 3 or a physician,14 has been held not to be the subject of recovery,
since the assumption that those agencies could and would have acted to prevent
the harm, unobstructed by any other contingency was nothing more than unjustified
supposition.
It is clear that the disposition of the question hinges upon the attitude of the
courts in the matter of proximate cause. In this connection it is interesting to
note the admission of the court in the principal case of the feasibility of the
allegation that the negligence of the telephone company was the proximate cause
of the death. "We assume," says the majority opinion at p. 309, "the hypothesis
of the death of the child as a proximate result to be more than mere speculation." Ir
It would appear, then, that this court would lean toward the theory of the Glawson
case that the damage is not so remote and speculative as to prevent a jury con-
sideration of the question of proximate cause. Yet it is submitted that, considered
in the light of the objections of conjecture and remoteness presented previously,
the hypothesis of the death as a proximate result is nothing more than mere specu-
lation,16 and, as such, cannot properly be submitted to the jury. A further blow
to the theory of tort liability in this situation would appear to be delivered by the
application of the consideration that the injuries resulting from a negligent tort must
be reasonably foreseeable to the tortfeasor.17 It might be argued that an examina-
11. Seifert v. Western Union Tel., 129 Ga. 181, 58 S. E. 699 (1907).
12. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Reynolds, 139 Ga. 385, 77 S. E. 388 (1913).
13. Forgey v. Macon Tel. Co., 291 Mo. 539, 237 S. W. 792 (1922) held that damages
resulting from fire where company failed to transmit call to fire department are "not
susceptible of legal proof."
14. Evans v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 135 Ky. 66, 121 S. W. 959 (1909), in which
the court said: "Nothing appears that, but for the alleged negligence, the death would
not have resulted."
15. 271 N. Y. 306, 309, 3 N. E. (2d) 434, 435 (1936).
16. It is further significant to note that even upon the application of the celebrated
"But For" rule-certainly the less stringent of the two criteria of legal cause--the negli-
gence in the instant case cannot be conclusively or satisfactorily termed the proximate
cause of the death.
17. McGill v. Michigan S. S. Co., 144 Fed. 788 (C. C. A. 9th, 1906); Wintersteen v.
National Coop. & Wood. Co., 361 fI1. 95, 197 N. E. 578 (1935); HARgen, ToRTS (1933)
§ 111.
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tion of the telephone company's advertising shows that the present situation was
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the subscription contract' s
and that therefore the risk was foreseeable considered as a matter of tort liability.
In answer, it is submitted that the sounder interpretation of the forseeability rule
is that the tortfeasor is liable when he knew, or should have known, that the result
would probably follow the negligent act, and not merely that it might follow.
That a telephone company will be held to so high a degree of omniscience seems, in
the light of the instant case, possible. The desirability of imposing such a standard
of care is, however, questionable.
18. The advertising program of the Rochester Tel. Corp., the defendant in the instant
case, includes a series featuring the slogan "When Seconds Count," illustrated by scenes
depicting the value of the telephone to the subscriber in times of fire, robbery or illness.
